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INTRODUCTION
The forum in which to appeal a district court action ordinarily is a
straightforward matter. Regardless of the subject matter of the
appeal, district court decisions are appealed to the regional circuit
court where the district court sits.1 In 1982, the matter of where to
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294 (1994).
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appeal a district court decision involving a patent issue became
somewhat more complex because of the creation of a new federal
circuit court of appeals, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.2
Congress created the Federal Circuit, in part, to unify the applica-
tion of the patent laws.3 To that end, Congress provided the Federal
Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction on a national scope, over actions in
which the district court's decision was based in whole or in part on 28
U.S.C. § 1338.' Section 1338(a) provides for original jurisdiction in
the district courts for "any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents."'
It is not always clear whether a district court's jurisdiction is based
on an "Act of Congress relating to patents," and consequently the
issue of whether an action should be appealed to the Federal Circuit
or the regional circuit court is often murky. Particularly vexing are
cases in which the patent count is added or dropped during the
pendency of the action in the district court, or in which a patent issue
is raised as a defense or counterclaim to a claim otherwise not raising
a patent issue. Congress' grant of nationwide subject matter
jurisdiction for patent cases to the Federal Circuit led to appellate
jurisdictional conflicts with the other regional circuits.6
In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,7 the Supreme Court
resolved many of the conflicts raised by the new circuit court's grant
ofjurisdiction over patent cases. In Christianson, the Court noted the
similar language, "arising under," that appeared in both the grant of
jurisdiction to the district courts for patent cases in § 1338 and the
general grant of federal question jurisdiction to the district courts in
28 U.S.C. § 1331.8 The Court also noted the similar policies served
2. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1981), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13-
16. "Uniformity was also sought in federal personnel, government contract, and Little Tucker
Act cases." Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1032 n.21, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 881, 892 n.21 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1) (endowing Federal Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from any district court's final decision).
5. Id. § 1338(a).
6. Subject matter also defines the jurisdiction of the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals ("TECA"). See Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179,
182 (2d Cir. 1979) (indicating that TECA has "exclusive appellate jurisdiction in... cases and
controversies arising under the [Economic Stabilization Act of 1970]"). It is clear, however, that
the jurisdictional analysis of the Federal Circuit was not meant to parallel that of the TECA. See
infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (noting that "traditional"jurisdictional analysis applies
to Federal Circuit jurisdiction, and TECA has "issue"jurisdiction).
7. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
8. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1988).
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by the two grants of jurisdiction and, accordingly, interpreted the
scope of § 1338 jurisdiction in the same way the scope of federal
question jurisdiction under § 1331 has been interpreted.' Thus, the
issue of whether an action'sjurisdiction arises under § 1338, and thus
is appealable to the Federal Circuit, is now determined by the two
part test used to determine § 131 jurisdiction: (i) does it appear
from the well-pleaded complaint that (ii) the case arises under federal
law?' 0
The Federal Circuit has, of course, followed the Christianson rule,
as it had prior to the Supreme Court's decision." It has not,
however, read the decision as requiring strict compliance with the
"well-pleaded complaint rule," as that rule is applied in the § 1331
context. 2 Rather, due to differences in the policies served by the
two statutory grants of jurisdiction among other considerations, the
Federal Circuit has interpreted Christianson as allowing the court
flexibility in interpreting its patent jurisdiction."
This Article agrees with the Federal Circuit's conclusion that strict
application of § 1331 precedent is neither warranted by Christianson
nor consistent with Congress' intent in creating appellate jurisdiction
in the Federal Circuit for actions based on § 1338. Specifically, the
purpose underlying federal question jurisdiction case law, which
appertains to state versus federal jurisdiction conflicts, is not always
applicable to Federal Circuit jurisdiction decisions (federal versus
federal appellate court conflicts), which may involve not only state
versus federal court jurisdiction conflicts but also federal versus
9. Ii at 807-09.
10. Id. at 809.
11. The Christianson decision affirmed the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional analysis in toto.
Id. Compare Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074,
1078 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that unless district court based its jurisdiction on patent law
claims, "mere allegation" that case involves patent laws does not give Federal Circuitjurisdiction)
and Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544,1550,3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241,
1245 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (expressing view that there was "no basis on which to posit a congressional
intent to deprive the regional circuits ofjurisdiction over every appeal that remotely involves a
patent issue") with Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 (finding that Federal Circuit hasjurisdiction only
when complaint includes cause of action created by federal patent laws or when plaintiff's claim
involves decision of "substantial question" of federal patent law). Thus, the Federal Circuit's
jurisdictional analysis has not, and presumably will not, change. Accordingly, both the post-
Christianson and pre-Christiansonjurisdictional decisions by the Federal Circuit are instructive.
12. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
741, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("It is apparent from their unanimous
opinion that the Justices did not intend to make a rigid application of the well-pleaded
complaint rule a Procrustean bed for this court's jurisdiction.").
13. See id. at 744-45, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (noting that well-pleaded complaint rule
should not thwart congressional goals in enacting § 1295 Federal Circuit jurisdiction and
stressing need to achieve greater uniformity in patent cases and to prohibit forum-shopping).
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federal jurisdiction conflicts.' 4 In federal versus federal jurisdiction
conflicts, the constitutional concerns underlying much of the § 1331
precedent are not implicated, and accordingly, this precedent should
not frustrate "Congress' goal of enhancing predictability and certainty
of the patent laws."' 5
Part I of this Article provides a brief review of federal question
jurisdiction under § 1331, including the tests developed by the
Supreme Court for determining whether an action "arises under"
federal law. Part II discusses the Federal Circuit's patent jurisdiction,
including the reasons underlying Congress' decision to depart from
the existing appellate structure and to grant the Federal Circuit
exclusive jurisdiction nationwide over actions based on § 1338. Part
III includes a discussion of the Christianson decision and why strict
application of the federal question jurisdiction on which the Court
relied is neither warranted by the decision nor desirable to effectuate
congressional intent. Part IV examines the Federal Circuit's treat-
ment of § 1338jurisdiction and offers suggestions for improving the
rules that determine Federal Circuit jurisdiction under Christianson.
Specifically, the Article suggests that an expansive view of Federal
Circuit jurisdiction is appropriate when the conflict is federal versus
14. Jurisdictional issues with respect to the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction arise in
two categories: (1) those distinguishing between federal and statejurisdiction, e.g., Prattv. Paris
Gas light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 260 (1897) ("Federal courts have no ight... to entertain
suits... where a subsisting contract is shown governing the rights of the party in the use of an
invention, and that such suits not only may, but must, be brought in the state courts."); Wade
v. Lawder, 165 U.S. 624, 627-28 (1897) (finding that contract for interest in patent was state
claim); Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46, 52 (1888) (restating law that enforcement of
contract for use of patent does not arise under federal law); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613,616-
17 (1882) (holding that failure to pay patent royalties under contract did not give rise to federal
jurisdiction); Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547, 556 (1878) ("Such a [contract] case is not
cognizable in a court of the United States by reason of its subject matter .... "); Wilson v.
Sanford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99, 101-02 (1850) (holding district court did not have jurisdiction
to hear action to set aside contract which infringed on appellant's patent rights); Vink v. Schijf,
839 F.2d 676, 676-77, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1728, 1730 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (involving suit that
involved either ownership issue under state law or patent infringement issue under federal law);
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 875-76, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 199 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(involving suit that was either contract action under state law or patent infringement suit under
federal law); and (2) those distinguishing between the Federal Circuit and the regional circuit
as the proper appellate tribunal, e.g., Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 807
F.2d 934, 9355-36, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 918, 919 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (demonstrating that, although
suit was properly in federal court under 35 U.S.C. § 32, question was whether it was patent
"case"); Dubost v. United States Patent and Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561,1565, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that suit was properly in district court under
mandamus statute, but thatjurisdictional issue concerned appropriate circuit court for appeal).
with regard to cases in the second category, it is often clear that a case is properly in federal
court; however, the question remains whether the district court's jurisdiction was based on 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (general federal question jurisdiction) or on 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (jurisdiction over
intellectual property questions).
15. Aerjet, 895 F.2d at 745, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
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federal because the Federal Circuit has a heightened interest in
reviewing cases involving patent issues and because the federalism
concerns underlying federal question precedent are not implicated.
On the other hand, in state versus federal conflicts, significant
federalism concerns underlying federal question precedent are
implicated, and strict application of federal question principles is
appropriate.
In the federal versus federal context, there is little harm in either
the Federal Circuit or the regional circuits hearing the case; thus,
bright line rules can be employed to avoid the jurisdictional "ping-
pong" discussed in Christianson. Bright line rules may help both the
courts and practitioners by simplifying the appellate pro-
cess-recognizing that an occasional patent case may be decided by
a regional circuit and a case involving no patent issues may be
determined by the Federal Circuit. Thus, in Part IV, specific
examples of cases are analyzed, including cases involving counter-
claims, amended complaints, consolidated cases, and cases where
there is a withdrawal, severance, or separation of a patent count.
Bright line rules are suggested where appropriate.
Finally, Part IV analyzes Federal Circuit decisions deciding the outer
limits of its "arising under" jurisdiction. The Article concludes that
the Federal Circuit has chosen to follow a more expansive reading of
its "arising under" jurisdiction, even when there is a state versus
federal conflict.
I. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION UNDER § 1338
Under the United States Constitution, federal courts may be given
jurisdiction over "[c]ases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority."16 "Cases that fall under
this head of jurisdiction are usually spoken of as involving a 'federal
question."'17
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is set out in Article III,
section 1 of the United States Constitution. In addition, the
Constitution provides Congress with the discretion to establish lower
federal courts and, if it so chooses, to determine the number and type
of federal courts.1" Congress did not exercise its constitutional
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
17. CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS 90 (4th ed. 1983).
18. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1, cl. 1; see Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922)
("The effect of [sections 1 and 2 of article III] is not to vest jurisdiction in the inferior courts
over the designated cases and controversies but to delimit these in respect of which Congress
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authority to create federal courts until 1875 when it enacted what
today has become 28 U.S.C. § 1331,'" which grants the federal courts
general original jurisdiction over federal question cases "in language
virtually the same as the Constitution,"2 both provisions using the
key "arising under" phrase.21
A. "Arising Under" as Interpreted in § 1331
Under § 1331, "[t] he district courts shall havejurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."22  Although the first version of this provision appeared in
1875,23 the "[f]ormulation of a general test for determining when an
action 'arises under' federal law has eluded the courts for more than
a century."24
It is well settled that "[a]lthough the language of § 1331 parallels
that of the 'Arising Under' Clause of Art. III ..... Art. III 'arising
under'jurisdiction is broader than federal-questionjurisdiction under
may conferjurisdiction upon such courts as it creates"); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441,
448-49 (1850) (reasoning that, because Congress may create federal courts, it also must have
authority to withhold certain controversies from theirjurisdiction); Carey v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3
How.) 286, 245 (1845) (finding that Congress' exclusive authority to create courts and
determine their jurisdiction also allows Congress to withhold jurisdiction from them).
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
20. WRIGHT, supra note 17, at 90-91.
21. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
22. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1976)).
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. at 470-73.
24. First Nat'l Bankv. Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 1980). See generally
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 (noting that no single definition of "arising under" has been
established since passage of Act of Mar. 3, 1875).
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§ 1331. '2s Under § 1331, a federal question must be more than an
ingredient of a cause of action to create federal jurisdiction.
In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Thust,28 one
of the Supreme Court's more recent analyses in this area, the Court
held:
Under our interpretations, Congress has given the lower federal
courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by removal from a state
court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint estab-
lishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the
plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.
27
Thus, federal question jurisdiction exists in two alternative, but
overlapping, situations: either (1) federal law must create the cause
of action; or (2) the plaintiff's right to relief must necessarily require
the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.
1. Federal law creates the cause of action
The first test, which was elucidated by Justice Holmes in American
Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co.,28 is generally referred to as the
"creation test. ' 29 Although sometimes still mistaken as the sole test
25. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,494-95 (1983); see also Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379-80 & n.51 (1959) (noting that
federal courts have been reluctant to read jurisdictional statutes broadly, thereby limiting their
jurisdiction; however, limitations placed on § 1331jurisdiction do not limit congressional power
to establish federal court jurisdiction); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506-07
(1900) (noting that Congress may decide whether federal courts have concurrent or exclusive
jurisdiction over enforcement of given right even if such right originated by laws of United
States); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 515 (1969) (stating that "the grant ofjurisdiction
in § 1331(a), while made in the language used in Art. In, is not in all respects co-extensive with
the potential for federal jurisdiction found in Art. III"). See generally ErnestJ. London, "Federal
Question"Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835, 841-48 (1959) (discussing
interpretation of statutory grants ofjurisdiction in limited fashion by requiring federal question
to be in complaint); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REv. 157, 160-61 (1953) (revealing that although Chief Justice Marshall interpreted "arising
under" language of Art. III broadly, courts have interpreted that same language in § 1331 more
narrowly, not according it "sweep of its constitutional ancestor").
It is noted that some decisions have read § 1331 more restrictively while purporting to apply
the Osborn rule which states that a case arises under federal law and the Constitution when a
federal question is an element of the cause of action. See Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257-
58 (1885) (noting that nothing in Constitution or laws of United States revoked NewYork City's
right to establish ferries, and therefore no federal question arose); Gold-Washing & Water Co.
v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199, 201-02 (1878) (requiring plaintiff to state facts giving rise to federal
question) (citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822 (1824)). See
generaly London, supra, at 841-48 (finding that there has been tendency to limit federal question
jurisdiction, even when cause of action clearly involved federal question).
26. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
27. Id. at 27-28.
28. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
29. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) ("A suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action."). Interestingly, in this case, plaintiff
1842
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for federal question jurisdictional determinations,"0 the Supreme
Court has stated:
[The "creation test"] is more useful for describing the vast majority
of cases that come within the district courts' original jurisdiction
than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court
jurisdiction.... [E]ven the most ardent proponent of the Holmes
test has admitted that it has been rejected as an exclusionary
principle."
Hence, the creation test is the most stringent test for federal jurisdic-
tion. If this test is met, federal jurisdiction will ordinarily lie."2 The
converse is not true; a cause of action may fail to meet this test, and
yet federal jurisdiction may be present under the second test.
2. Resolution of a substantial question offederal law
Federal question jurisdiction also may lie when the right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
law. The application of this second test for finding original jurisdic-
tion of federal district courts is more difficult and controversial than
the first; it is whatJustice Frankfurter termed the "litigation-provoking
problem."33
One of the most expansive interpretations of§ 1331 "arising under"
jurisdiction under the "resolution of a substantial question of federal
law" test is found in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.' In Smith,
the Kansas City Title & Trust Co. planned to invest company funds in
bonds issued by Federal Land Banks pursuant to the Federal Farm
Loan Act.3 Plaintiffs sued to prevent this investment, alleging that
alleged that defendant had libeled and slandered it by accusing it of patent infringement. I&
at 258. The Court held that the suit did not arise under the patent laws: "The fact that the
justification may involve the validity and infringement of a patent is no more material to the
question under what law the suit is brought than it would be in an action of contract." Id. at
260.
30. See Consolidated World Housewares, Inc. v. Finkle, 831 F.2d 261, 265, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1565,1568 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (dismissing appeal for lack ofjurisdiction because patent laws
"could not possibly create [the] 'cause of action' under § 1338"). The court apparently did not
consider, however, whether the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily required a construction of
the patent laws. Id
31. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9 (citations omitted); Dubost v. United States Patent and
Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1565,227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977,979 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9).
32. Even this, however, is only "ordinarily" true. See Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177
U.S. 505, 513 (1900) (denying federaljurisdiction--even though federal statute authorized suits
to determine mining rights-because local rules or customs governed result); see also Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (requiring federal claim to be substantial).
33. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
34. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
35. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1921).
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the Act was unconstitutional."6 State law required investments by the
company to be legal37 and provided the shareholders injunctive
relief if the investments were not.38
The Court held that there was federal question jurisdiction in this
case, stating:
[I] t appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right
to relief depends upon the construction or application of the
Constitution or laws of the United States .... '[T]he title or right
set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the
Constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the
opposite construction.'
39
The Supreme Court found federal question jurisdiction even though
federal law neither created the cause of action nor provided the
relief, both being creatures of state law. The Court later charac-
terized this case as one in which "a case 'arose under' federal law
where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on
some construction of federal law."4"
Other cases have refused to find federal question jurisdiction when
federal law created the cause of action but local rules and customs
governed the result.41 Judge Friendly acknowledged the Smith
rationale and seemingly endorsed it in dicta in TB. Harms Co. v.
Eliscu,42 although he found that even by using this test, there was no
federal jurisdiction.43 Other cases have reached this result in dicta
as well.' Only a few cases have accepted federal jurisdiction on the
36. Id. at 195.
37. Id. at 199.
38. Id. at 201-02.
39. Id. at 199 (quoting Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822
(1824)).
40. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)
(citations omitted).
41. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934) (denying federal
question jurisdiction when violation of federal standard was element of state court tort suit);
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505,513 (1900) (finding that federal statute authorized
suit to determine adverse claims to mining right, but there was no jurisdiction because local
rules or customs were to govern result); see also Roecker v. United States, 379 F.2d 400, 407-08
(5th Cir.) (finding that state law governed case, even though applicable federal statute did not
require reference to state law), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
42. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
43. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Even though the claim is
created by state law, a case may 'arise under' a law of the United States if the complaint discloses
a need for determining the meaning or application of such a law.").
44. See, e.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v.Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375, 1381-82 (10th Cir. 1978)
(stating that, on its face, complaint raised substantial federal question based on Phase IV of oil
regulations), cert. denied 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Garrett v. Time-D.C., Inc., 502 F.2d 627, 629 (9th
Cir. 1974) (examining Smith test and finding case satisfied test, although jurisdiction in case
arose under § 1337, rather than § 1331), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Warrington Sewer Co.
v. Tracy, 463 F.2d 771, 772 (3d Cir. 1972) (noting that test for presence of federal question is
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basis of the Smith analysis alone.' In fact, the jurisdictional analysis
by the Supreme Court in cases subsequent to Smith casts doubt as to
the viability of the Smith rationale.46
Recent Supreme Court cases have reaffirmed, however, the
principle "that a case may arise under federal law 'where the
vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some
construction of federal law,"' 47 but the holdings in these cases
demonstrate "that this statement must be read with caution."48
whether state claim "presents 'a pivotal question of federal law'" (citations omitted from
original)).
45. See, eg., Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 328 (2d Cir. 1982)
(finding that claim not only was created by federal law, but claim turned on preemption
contained in Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), aff'd mem., 463 U.S. 1220
(1983); Christopher v. Cavallo, 662 F.2d 1082,1083-84 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that construction
of copyright law was essential element of state breach of warranty claim and, thus, posed
substantial federal question); Sweeny v. Abramovitz, 449 F. Supp. 213, 214-16 (D. Conn. 1978)
(explaining that police officer's suit against citizen for malicious prosecution was properly
removed to district court when that suit was based on earlier suit by citizen against officer for
alleged violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871); see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570
(1956) (resolving issue of copyright ownership when there was no question of infringement and
no diversity of citizenship; presence of federal question, therefore, was only basis for
jurisdiction). Although the Supreme Court did not address jurisdiction in De Sylva, there is little
possibility that the Court overlooked the issue because the circuit court opinion included a
sharply worded dissent arguing that the case should be dismissed for want of federal jurisdiction.
Balentine v. De Sylva, 226 F.2d 623, 634-36 (9th Cir. 1955) (Fee, J., dissenting).
46. See Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933). The Court stated-
Federal jurisdiction may be invoked to vindicate a right or privilege claimed under a
federal statute. It may not be invoked where the right asserteid is non-federal, merely
because the plaintiff's right to sue is derived from federal law, or because the property
involved was obtained under federal statute. The federal nature of the right to be
established is decisive-not the source of the authority to establish it.
Id.; see Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1937) ("'The federal nature of the right to
be established is decisive .... - (quoting Puerto Rico, 288 U.S. at 483)). One commentator
explains:
[The tests for federal question jurisdiction] announced in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.
and Gully v. First Nat 'lBank, cannot be reconciled with Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co .... The dominant trend of the cases through Gully v. First Nat'l Bank... makes
clear that it is never enough, for purposes of the jurisdictional statute... that a case
involves one or more incidental questions arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, if the plaintiff's cause of action itself was not created by federal law.
London, supra note 25, at 853. Another commentator remarks:
[T]he Court in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. required only that the right to
relief depend on the construction or application of federal law. Subsequent cases do
not resolve the apparent conflict; nor do they make clear, if Smith is valid, the precise
sense in which the asserted right to relief must be dependent on federal law.
Note, The Outer Limits of "Arising Under", 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 978,982 (1979) (footnotes omitted).
47. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)).
48. IL- at 809. In Franchise Tax Bd., "the central issue ... turned on the meaning of
[ERISA], but [the Court] nevertheless concluded that federaljurisdiction was lacking." 463 U.S.
at 28. In Merrell Dow, the misbranding of a drug in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act was alleged as an element in a state law suit sounding in tort, and federal question
jurisdiction was denied. 478 U.S. at 805-07.
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In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson," the Supreme
Court recognized "the widely perceived 'irreconcilable' conflict
between the finding of federal jurisdiction in Smith ... and the
finding of no jurisdiction in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co.""0
The Court explained, however, that "the differences in results can be
seen as manifestations of the differences in the nature of the federal
issues at stake."" The issue of the "constitutionality of an important
federal statute" addressed in Smith was a more significant federal
interest than the issue in Moore, which concerned "the violation of [a]
federal standard as an element of state tort recovery."52 The
violation of the federal standard in Moore "did not fundamentally
change the state tort nature of the action" according to the Court in
Merrell Dow. 3
The majority in Merrell Dow found it persuasive that, by denying
federal question jurisdiction, Congress did not provide a private
remedy for violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA").' This, according to the majority, "is tantamount to a
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of
the statute as an element of a state cause of action is insufficiently
'substantial' to confer federal-question jurisdiction."55
The four dissenting Justices disagreed with this rationale, viewing
Smith as the law instead and "Moore as having.., been in a state of
innocuous desuetude." 6 The dissent was not persuaded that the
failure of Congress to provide a federal remedy should affect federal
jurisdiction. 7
49. 478 U.S. 804 (1988).
50. Id- at 814 n.12 (discussing Moore v. Chesapeake and Ohio R. Co., 291 U.S. 205 (1934)).
51. I. at 814-15 n.12.
52. Id. (explaining why federal jurisdiction was found in Smith but not in Moore).
53. Id
54. See id. at 814 (concluding that Congress did not intend federal cause of action for FDCA
violation based on congressional decision not to supply private remedy).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 822 n.1 (BrennanJ., dissenting) (explaining that Supreme Court has never relied
on Moore but that Smith has been accepted widely by lower courts). The dissent in Moore is not
persuasive because it fails to explain or even to recognize the other cases that are inconsistent
with Smith. See supra note 46 (noting cases that are inconsistent with Smith).
57. SeeMrrellDow, 478 U.S. at 825 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (advocating looking to reasons
why Congress withheld federal remedy before concluding that Congress also intended to
withhold federal jurisdiction). It should be emphasized that the dissentingJustices in Merrell
Dowwould construe federal question jurisdiction more broadly than the majority. See id. at 818
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (recognizing "great breadth" of federal questionjurisdiction). Thus,
the analysis below, see infra text accompanying notes 400-04, whereby the majority analysis is used
to show that the Federal Circuit has broadjurisdiction over federal disputes involving patent law,
would necessarily carry with it the dissent's agreement.
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It seems likely that in evaluating the "nature of the federal interest
at stake,"58 the Court is recognizing that the states have an interest
in maintaining jurisdiction over cases involving their citizens and in
being the final arbiter over their laws.59 If there were no such
interest, it would be unnecessary to evaluate the nature of the federal
interest; federal courts would take jurisdiction whenever federal law
was an "ingredient" of the cause of action.'
The rule that federal jurisdiction will lie if the title or right claimed
by the party may be defeated by one construction of the Constitution
or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construc-
tion, is subject at least to the limitation that the federal question must
either prescribe the remedy sought, 1 create the cause of action,
6 2
or be a question central to the dispute.' The "right or immunity
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an
element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of action."6
It is not sufficient that the question merely be "lurking in the back-
ground."65
The decision in Smith is consistent with the limitation that the
federal question must be central to the case or must be real and
substantial. There, the federal question was obviously significant.
66
State law provided only that injunctive relief would be available if the
investments were not legal.6 The determination as to whether the
58. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 n.12.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 188-94 for a complete discussion of the state and
federal interests in exercising jurisdiction over particular cases.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27 (explaining that federal question jurisdiction
requires substantial question of federal law and not merely ingredient of federal law).
61. See Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 426 (1883) (finding remedy consisting of
seizure and detention of goods, authorized by federal bankruptcy law, sustainable by district
court despite contrary state law).
62. SeeAmerican Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257,260 (1916) ("A suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action."); Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228
U.S. 22, 25-26 (1913) (finding good faith claim based on federal statute has federaljurisdiction).
63. See Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U.S. 486,489 (1917) (requiring complaint to involve federal
question "really and substantially"); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505,509-12 (1900)
(finding no federal jurisdiction in case that merely presents question of fact and "does not
involve any question as to the construction or effect of the Constitution or laws of the United
States"); see also Note, supra note 46, at 994-95 (explaining that practical purpose of requiring
federal question to be central to dispute is "to prevent the exercise of federal jurisdiction on the
basis of remote or purely speculative federal propositions").
64. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936).
65. I& at 117 (denying federal jurisdiction for suit involving state contract claim with only
tenuous connection to federal law).
66. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-201 (1921) (finding that claim
turned on "the constitutional validity of an Act of Congress" and therefore jurisdiction was
proper).
67. 1I at 199, 201-02.
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investments were legal turned on the constitutionality of a federal
statute.
B. The "Well-Pleaded Complaint" Rule
In determining whether a cause of action is one "arising under" the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States-that is, whether
"federal law creates the cause of action or... the plaintiff's right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal law" 9-one "powerful doctrine" has emerged: the "'well-
pleaded complaint' rule."7" This rule provides:
[W]hether a case is one arising under the Constitution or a law or
treaty of the United States ... must be determined from what
necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in
the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation
of avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may
interpose.7
It is not "sufficient that a... claim alleges a single theory under
which resolution of a [federal claim] is essential."72 If there is an
alternate theory under which relief can be granted apart from federal
law, then the claim does not "arise under" federal law.73  The
plaintiff's right to relief must necessarily require a resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.74
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the plaintiff is the master
of his claim.7" If a federal claim is available but not asserted, there
is no federal jurisdiction. 6  The plaintiffs control of the claim is
68. See supra text accompanying notes 36-40 (explaining that although cause of action arose
under state law, its ultimate resolution turned on some construction of federal law).
69. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).
70. Id.
71. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74,75-76 (1914); see also Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S.
109, 113 (1936) ("[T]he controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided
by the answer or by the petition for removal."); Louisville & Nashville LR. v. Mottley, 211 U.S.
149, 152 (1908) (holding that "plaintiff's original cause of action" must "arise[J under the
Constitution").
72. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988).
73. See id (stating that federal claim must be essential to each alternative theory set forth
in complaint). When both state and federal grounds are available, plaintiff may rely solely on
state grounds. That the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim is irrelevant.
See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 26 & n.29 (recognizing that state law will determine whether
claim is stated); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (deciding whether claim has been stated
is properly determined by court that assumes jurisdiction).
74. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810 (requiring entire claim, not just element of claim, to
be governed by federal law).
75. See Fair v. Kohler Die Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) ("[T]he party who brings a suit is
master to decide what law he will rely upon" and thus what jurisdiction will apply.).
76. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918) (holding that claim of
negligence under common law is not removable to federal court where plaintiff did not plead
federal claim even if federal claim was available). See generally 14A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
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limited, however, insofar as the "artful pleading" rule prohibits a
plaintiff from using artful pleading in order to avoid or create federal
jurisdiction."
II. THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRcurr AND JURISDICTION
OVER ACTIONS BASED ON § 1338
The circumstances and controversies surrounding the creation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are well documented."
One of the strongest motivations for creating the court was the
general dissatisfaction over the disparate application of the patent laws
by the various regional circuits.79 Many believed that creating a
single uniform appellate forum for all patent appeals would foster
uniform application of the patent laws thus furthering the goals of the
patent laws.80
A. Congress Intended to Create a Single Forum for Patent Appeals to
Unif the Patent Law
There were several ways Congress could have attempted to
harmonize the application of the patent laws, including the creation
of specialized trial courts. Congress instead left trial jurisdiction over
patent cases in the district courts and created a single forum for
taking patent appeals.81
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722 (1985) (discussing cases based on existence of federal
question).
77. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981) (stating that court
may properly remove case if claims set forth in complaint are "federal in nature").
78. See, e.g., Emmette F. Hale, III, The "Arising Under" Jurisdiction Of the Federal Circuit: An
Opportunity for Uniformity in Patent Law, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 229-30 (1986) (discussing
legislative history leading to creation of Federal Circuit and jurisdiction of Federal Circuit and
urging abandonment of well-pleaded complaint rule in Federal Circuit); Howard T. Markey, The
Court ofAppealsfor the Federal Circuit: Challenge and Opportunity, 34 AM. U. L REV 595, 595 (1985)
(stating challenge to Federal Circuit "is to create and maintain a uniform, reliable, predictable,
nationally-applicable body of law"); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts
Improvement Act- A Practitioner's Perspective 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 389-400 (1984) (discussing
jurisdiction and procedure of Federal Circuit and noting that when only one appellate court
hears cases in given area, errors may be less obvious).
79. See Hale, supra note 78, at 238 ("The Act's central purpose is 'to reduce the widespread
lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine that exists in the administration of patent
law."' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 22.23 (1981))); Sward & Page, supra
note 78, at 387 ("The lack of uniformity in patent law has long been recognized as a serious
problem in American jurisprudence.").
80. See Hale, supra note 78, at 239 (stating that "the change in the appellate route for
patent appeals was designed to have a beneficial effect on the nation's economy" by reducing
forum shopping, creating uniformity, and increasing investments for new inventions (citing H.R.
REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., lst Sess. 22-23 (1981))).
81. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127(a), 96 Stat. 37
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994)) (creating Federal Circuit to have
jurisdiction over district court decisions involving patent claims).
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Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, district court patent
decisions were appealed, along with virtually all other district court
appeals, to the regional circuit where the district court was located. 2
After the creation of the Federal Circuit, patent cases were to be
appealed to that forum exclusively."3 Although in theory this
appellate system was as straight forward as before, in practice the new
process often created uncertainty when it was not entirely clear
whether a particular action was indeed appealable to the Federal
Circuit.
8 4
B. Demarcating the Federal Circuit's Patent Jurisdiction Requires
Interpreting § 1338
Congress defined the boundary line between the regional circuit
courts and the Federal Circuit in patent cases by reference to 28
U.S.C. § 1338, an existing statute that specifically grants jurisdiction
to the trial courts. 5 Thus, determining the scope of the Federal
Circuit's patent jurisdiction necessarily requires interpreting the
jurisdictional basis of the trial court over the action.8 6
By granting the Federal Circuit case jurisdiction under § 1338,
Congress intended to delineate a bright line for purposes of deter-
mining which actions the new circuit was to take on appeal.8 7
Whether an action is based on § 1338, in whole or in part, is not as
clear an inquiry as Congress might have thought.
Section 1338 predates the creation of the Federal Circuit 8 and
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts over all actions
that arise under any Act of Congress relating to patents.8 9  Of
course, the district courts already have jurisdiction by virtue of § 1331
82. See Act ofJune 25, 1948, Pub. L No. 80-773, § 1291, 62 Stat. 929 (granting courts of
appeals jurisdiction over all final decisions of United States district courts).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (directing all appeals of district court decisions based on patent
claims to go to Federal Circuit).
84. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing two types of jurisdictional
conflicts relating to actions appealable to Federal Circuit).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (granting original jurisdiction to district courts over patent-related
claims).
86. SeeAbbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1349-50, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1192, 1195
(Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The path of appeal is determined by the basis ofjurisdiction in the district
court, and is not controlled by the district court's decision or the substance of the issues that
are appealed.").
87. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1981).
88. The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
Section 1338 was created by Act ofJune 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 931.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
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federal question jurisdiction." Thus, § 1338 can provoke two types
ofjurisdictional conflict.
First, as in cases brought under § 1381, lawsuits filed under § 1338
may present the question whether the particular action should be in
federal district court or in state court." For instance, the action may
be a patent licensing dispute requiring possible resolution of a patent
scope or a validity question.92 On a motion for removal or dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, absent diversity, the trial court
must decide whether the case is properly in district court under
§ 1338 or properly in state court under a contract matter.93 This
type of conflict directly implicates the federalism concerns underlying
federal question precedent.94
Second, unlike § 1331 cases, § 1338 cases may involve a conflict
over whether a given action's jurisdiction is based on § 1338, § 1381,
or another source of federal jurisdiction.95 The action, for example,
may be for antitrust damages due to predatory acts, and resolution
may require a decision whether the defendant fraudulently obtained
or enforced a patent.96 Until the advent of the Federal Circuit, the
issue of whether the district court's jurisdiction was based on, say,
§ 1331 or § 1338 was a distinction without a difference with respect
to appellate jurisdiction; both actions were brought in federal district
court, and both were appealed to the regional circuit court.9" With
90. &d § 1331.
91. See e.g., Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 853 F.2d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that
regional courts have jurisdiction over disputes when issues are "merely incidentally implicated");
AT&T v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324-25, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1918, 1920 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (transferring case to state court despite claim of "misuse and misappropriation of
proprietary information" because "[t] he only possible patent issue is the purport of the language
of the contract'); Speedco Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 910, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1638 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (appealing district court's decision to dismiss case due to lack of federaljurisdiction).
92. See supra note 91 (citing cases in which issue was whether state or federal court should
have jurisdiction).
93. See Speedo, 853 F.2d at 911, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639 (stating that district court
"could have assumed jurisdiction ... only under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)" when there was no
diversity).
94. See i&L at 914-15, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642 (recognizing that state courts may address
patent-related issues, even though it is outside theirjurisdiction, to decide cases properly before
them).
95. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
745, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1678 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding federal jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338 when patent infringement was alleged in compulsory counterclaim because it was
separate and nonfrivolous and thus finding appellatejurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295); Atari,
Inc. v.JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1424,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(raising issue of basis of federal jurisdiction).
96. See Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 70 F.3d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1995).
97. Compare Act ofJune 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1291, 62 Stat. 929 ("The court of
appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States.") with 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994) (granting Federal Circuit jurisdiction over
United States district court final decisions "based, in whole or in part, on Section 1338").
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the creation of the Federal Circuit, however, this issue now requires
close attention. Conflict of this nature does not implicate the
federalism concerns underlying federal question precedent as the case
is already properly in federal court.9"
III. CHRISTIANSON AND THE APPLICATION OF FEDERAL QUESTION
JURISDICTION PRECEDENT TO FEDERAL CIRCUIT
JURISDICTION DECISIONS
In 1988, the Supreme Court resolved a celebrated jurisdictional
dispute between the Seventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit 99 Both
circuits were convinced the other had jurisdiction over the ap-
peal."tu In resolving the dispute, the Court provided firm ground
rules for the resolution of future appellate jurisdictional conflicts by
basing its decision on an existing body of case law settling a somewhat
similar jurisdictional conflict: federal question jurisdiction.'0 '
A. The Christianson Decision
In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.," °2 Christianson, a
former employee of Colt, brought an antitrust action against Colt. 3
Colt, "the leading manufacturer ... of M-16 rifles and their
parts,"x 4 patented many improvements to the rifle while "main-
tain[ing] a shroud of secrecy around certain specifications essential
to the mass production of interchangeable M-16 parts." 5
Christianson, while employed by Colt, signed a nondisclosure
agreement, contractually obligating him not to disclose some of the
information that Colt considered proprietary and kept secret."'
After leaving Colt, Christianson formed International Trade Services,
Inc. ("ITS"), which also manufactured and sold M-16 parts. 7 This
business utilized the alleged proprietary information.108  "Colt
notified several of [Christianson's] current and potential customers
98. See Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 743-44, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (finding no threat of
federal-state conflicts because case was properly in federal court).
99. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
100. Id. at 803-04 (observing that each circuit has stated that it lacks jurisdiction to decide
case).
101. See id- at 808-09 (comparing statutoryjurisdiction of Federal Circuit to federal question
jurisdiction).
102. 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
103. Id. at 804-05.
104. IMt at 804.
105. Id.
106. IM. (stating that Colt contractually required employees not to disclose manufacturing
specifications).
107. Me.
108. let (finding that ITS's business was dependent on Colt's trade secrets).
1852
1996] CHEMSTIANSON v. COLT INDUSTRIES OPERATING CORP. 1853
that [Christianson was] illegally misappropriating Colt's trade secrets,
and urged them to refrain from doing business with [Christian-
son] ."
Christianson and ITS sued Colt in district court under sections 4
and 16 of the Clayton Act" and sections I and 2 of the Sherman
Act,"' alleging:
The validity of the Colt patents had been assumed throughout the
life of the Colt patents through 1980. Unless such patents were
invalid through the wrongful retention of proprietary information
in contravention of United States Patent Law (35 U.S.C. § 112), in
1980, when such patents expired, anyone "who has ordinary skill in
the rifle-making art" is able to use the technology of such expired
patents for which Colt earlier had a monopoly position for 17 years.
... ITS and anyone else has the right to manufacture, contract
for the manufacture, supply, market and sell the M-16 and M-16
parts and accessories thereof at the present time.11 2
ITS moved for summary judgment alleging that Colt's patents were
invalid for failure to satisfy the enablement and best mode require-
ments of 35 U.S.C. § 112.1" ITS further argued that because "Colt
benefited from the protection of the invalid patents," the trade secrets
lost any state-law protection they might have otherwise had."'
The district court based its decision to award summaryjudgment on
the § 112 theory set forth in ITS's complaint."5 The Supreme
Court characterized the next sequence of events as follows:
[Colt] appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which, after full briefing and argument, concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction and issued an unpublished order transferring the
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The
Seventh Circuit, however, raising the jurisdictional issue sua sponte,
concluded that the Federal Circuit was "clearly wrong" and
transferred the case back. The Federal Circuit, for its part, adhered
to its priorjurisdictional ruling, concluding that the Seventh Circuit
exhibited "a monumental misunderstanding of the patent jurisdic-
tion granted this court" and was "clearly wrong." Nevertheless, the
Federal Circuit proceeded to address the merits in the "interest of
justice" and reversed the District Court."'6
109. Id. at 805.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1994).
111. Id. §§ 1, 2.
112. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 805.
113. Id. at 806.
114. IM
115. Id.
116. Id. at 806-07 (citations omitted).
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At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court noted:
[I] n order to demonstrate that a case is one "arising under" federal
patent law "the plaintiff must set up some right, title or interest
under the patent laws, or at least make it appear that some right or
privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the
opposite construction of these laws.""'
The Court explained that it is the complainant which must establish
that "'federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.""'" Thus, the Court concluded, there will
only be federal jurisdiction under § 1338(a) if "patent law is a
necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims."" 9
The Court also opined that the well-pleaded complaint cannot
merely allege a single theory requiring resolution of a patent law
issue, and that "a claim supported by alternative theories in the
complaint may not form the basis for § 1338(a) jurisdiction unless
patent law is essential to each of those theories."2 ' The Court
noted further that "[t]he patent law issue, while arguably necessary to
at least one theory under each claim, is not necessary to the overall
success of either claim."' 2'
The concurring opinion by Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Blackmun, did not read the majority opinion as "determining [the
Federal Circuit's] appellate jurisdiction only through an examination
of the complaint as initially filed."12  Instead, the concurring
Justices believed that "[t] he Court expressly leaves open the question
whether a constructive amendment could provide the foundation for
Federal Circuit patent-law jurisdiction ... and says nothing on the
subject whether actual amendments to the complaint can so suf-fice." 123
The majority noted that its opinion does "not decide under what
circumstances, if any, a court of appeals could furnish itself a
jurisdictional basis unsupported by the pleadings by deeming the
complaint amended in light of the parties' 'express or implied
consent' to litigate a claim." 124 According to the majority, there was
117. Id. at 807-08 (quoting Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 (1897)).
118. Id. at 808 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 27-28 (1983)).
119. Id. (comparing § 1338(a) jurisdiction to federal question jurisdiction).
120. Id. at 810.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 824 (StevenJ., concurring).
123. Id. (StevensJ, concurring) (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 814-15.
1854
1996] CIRISTIANSON v. COLT INDUSTRIES OPERATING CORP. 1855
no reason to decide this question because there was no evidence that
the parties so consented.1"
B. Fundamental Assumptions Underlying the Christianson Decision
In Christianson, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Circuit's
determination12 that the "arising under" language in §§ 1331 and
1338 had to be interpreted identically, that is, that cases "arise under"
§ 1338 as they "arise under" § 1331 and that the well-pleaded
complaint rule must apply to both sections.'27
The issues which confronted the Court in Christianson were narrow:
whether the allegation of a single theory in a well-pleaded claim, for
which resolution of a patent law question is essential, can confer
§ 1338 jurisdiction; 28 and whether the Federal Circuit could reach
the merits despite a determination at the end of briefing and oral
arguments that jurisdiction was lacking.' 9 There are, however,
modifications which can be made to the well-pleaded complaint rule
and traditional "arising under" analysis that make it better fit the
unique circumstances of the Federal Circuit." The underlying
incentive for making such modifications is the distinction between the
federal versus state context in which the traditional federal question
125. Id. (concluding that patent law claim was never raised nor did evidence show that
parties agreed to litigate such claim).
126. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241
(Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). The vacation and remand of the
Federal Circuit's decision does not indicate disapproval of the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional
analysis. The disposition of the case by the Supreme Court resulted from the peculiar decision
by the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit first held that it did not have jurisdiction over the
case but then held, in the interest ofjustice, that it would decide the appeal. 822 F.2d at 1559-
60, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252-53. The Supreme Court found that its "agreement with the
Federal Circuit's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction, compels us to disapprove of its decision
to reach the merits anyway 'in the interest ofjustice.'" 486 U.S. at 818 (quoting Christianson, 822
F.2d at 1559). The Court vacated the Federal Circuit'sjudgment because of "It]he age-old rule
that a court may not in any case, even in the interest ofjustice, extend its jurisdiction where
none exists...." Id.
Why the Federal Circuit resolved the appeal after acknowledging that it lacked jurisdiction
is a matter of some speculation. The court was, no doubt, aware of the "age-old" rule that it
could not resolve the merits of a case when it had nojurisdiction. There were, of course, other
options open to the court. It expressly noted that it could have certified the case to the
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3). 822 F.2d at 1560, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1252.
Also, it could have accepted jurisdiction based on the doctrine of law of the case. See Kori Corp.
v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 657 (Fed. Cir.) (stating law of case
doctrine precludes deciding what already had been decided), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985).
127. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808-09 (noting that cases concerning federal question
jurisdiction and cases interpreting statutoryjurisdiction "have quite naturally applied the same
test' due to identical language in §§ 1331 and 1338).
128. I& at 809.
129. Id. at 818.
130. See infra part IV-A1 (suggesting that counterclaims raising patent issues be permitted
to confer § 1338 jurisdiction) and part IV.B.2 (suggesting that "arising under" be interpreted
more broadly in certain jurisdictional determinations).
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determinations are made.'' That distinction makes the application
of traditionaljurisdictional case law in some circumstances inappropri-
ate, overly restrictive, and unworkable. To the extent the Christianson
decision can be read to require §§ 1338 and 1331 to be applied
identically, the decision is overly restrictive.
1. The rationale for interpreting "arising under" identically in §§ 1338
and 1331
The Court in Christianson determined that the "clear congressional
intent" is for the well-pleaded complaint rule to apply to § 1338.131
Noting the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (a) (1), which gives the
Federal Circuit jurisdiction over "an appeal from.., a district court
... if the jurisdiction of that court was based ... on § 1338, " ls the
Court looked to whether and how district courtjurisdiction was deter-
mined.1M
Insofar as the Court was rejecting an end of the traditional
approach to appellate jurisdictional determinations, it correctly
concluded that it was foreclosed by the legislature from adopting such
an approach. 5 Further, such an approach would promote special-
ization, something which Congress expressly sought to avoid."3 6 To
the extent the Court may have intended to preclude any modifica-
tions to traditional "arising under"jurisprudence and the well-pleaded
complaint rule, however, its decision was unnecessarily restrictive and
unworkable.137
131. See Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934, 936, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 918, 919-20 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding suit was properly in federal court under 35 U.S.C.
§ 32, and thus only question was whether it was patent "case"); Dubost v. United States Patent
& Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1563-65, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(recounting that district court held jurisdiction under statute but determining that district
court's jurisdiction also was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), thus finding proper jurisdiction in
circuit court for appeal).
132. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814.
133. Id. at 814-15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1982)).
134. Id. at 814.
135. Congress acted wisely in foreclosing a "case actually litigated" approach tojurisdictional
determinations. Although such an approach would ensure that the jurisdictional division
between the Federal Circuit and the regional circuits is drawn more accurately along subject
matter lines, it would require new and unfamiliarjurisdictional determinations to be made. As
experience has shown, injecting the judicial system with new jurisdictional determinations
extracts a cost in uncertainty that may be too high a price to pay. See Kennedy v. Wright, 851
F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussingjurisdictional determinations under 28 U.S.C. § 1253).
136. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a National
Patent Court, 49 Mo. L. REv. 43, 58-59 (1984) (noting that congressional commission studying
federal appellate court system found many objections to concept of specialized courts).
137. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (asserting that § 1331 precedent is not
implicated by Christianson and that Christianson should therefore not be used to frustrate
congressional objectives concerning predictability of patent laws).
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a. Identical phraseology
The Court first noted that both § 1338's precursor, which provided
forjurisdiction over patent-related cases in district courts, and § 1331,
which provides for jurisdiction in district court over cases which arise
under federal law, use "arising under" language identical to that in
§ 1338.11 These sections, according to the Court, "quite naturally'
are interpreted similarly. 9 The Court explained:
Linguistic consistency, to which we have historically adhered,
demands that § 1338(a) jurisdiction [like § 1331 jurisdiction]
likewise extend only to those cases in which a well-pleaded
complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the
cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent
law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-
pleaded claims."4
One alternative to the well-pleaded complaint rule, which the Court
recognized, was to fix the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit "'by
reference to the case actually litigated.""14' The Court rejected this
approach, however, emphasizing that Congress "determined the
relevant focus" in granting the Federal Circuitjurisdiction over cases
in which the district court's jurisdiction was based on § 1338.1' The
Court went on to explain that "[s]ince the district court's jurisdiction
is determined by reference to the well-pleaded complaint, not the
well-tried case, the referent for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction must
be the same.""4
Another option is to apply something other than the traditional
"arising under" analysis and the well-pleaded complaint rule, that is,
to apply a modified "arising under" analysis and a modified version of
the well-pleaded complaint rule, in determining district court
138. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 805; see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."); id. § 1338 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant
variety protection and copyright cases."); Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259
(1987) (distinguishing, in case involving precursor to § 1338, between questions arising under
patent laws, which state courts may have jurisdiction over, and cases arising under patent laws,
where federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction).
139. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 808.
140. Id at 808-09.
141. Id at 813 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 31).
142. Id. at 813-14.
143. Id. at 814.
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jurisdiction under § 1338.'" The Court was not precluded from
interpreting § 1295 in this manner, and, in fact, as the Federal Circuit
has recognized, something other than the traditional analysis should
be applied because certain jurisdictional dilemmas facing the Federal
Circuit never arose before the advent of that court and cannot be
resolved using existing jurisdictional notions." For example, when
a case is otherwise properly in federal court, as the Christianson case
was,'46 all of the pleadings,'47 or certain pleadings in addition to
the complaint, could be considered in determining whether the case
"arises under" patent law.148
The identical phraseology argument contains several disputable
assumptions. First, the Court is assuming that Congress appreciated
the import of the "arising under" term and intended that "arising
under" have the same meaning in both contexts. 149 The Supreme
Court's admonition that "the phrase 'arising under' masks a welter of
issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and
the proper management of the federal judicial system"150 under-
mines that assumption. 15'
The fallacy of this assumption is accentuated in this case because
the phrase "arising under" appears in both the Constitution and 28
144. SeeAerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerliken-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
741-44, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1674-77 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussing need for flexibility in
Federal Circuit jurisdiction under well-pleaded complaint and arising under rules).
145. Id. at 743-44, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676-77 (finding that congressional goals are
facilitated when appeals in non-frivolous patent cases, whether found in complaints or
compulsory counterclaims, are directed to Federal Circuit).
146. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting that Christianson filed suit for anti-
trust violations).
147. The pleadings permitted are the complaint, answer, reply to a counterclaim, answer to
a cross-claim, a third-party complaint-if a person who was not an original party is summoned
under FED. R. CIv. P. 14-and a third-party answer. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(a).
148. Also, the Court simply could have stated that, in view of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act, jurisdiction will be determined differently when patents are involved.
Although unusual, such a result would not be unprecedented. An exception to the well-pleaded
complaint rule already exists when the preemptive force of a federal body of law is so powerful
as to displace entirely any state cause of action. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S.
557, 559-62 (1968).
149. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 814 (1988) (quoting H.R
REP. No., supra note 87, at 41).
150. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
151. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1, 35 (1989). In discussing the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, Dreyfuss noted:
Congress had hoped to relieve the regional circuits of the burden of deciding
technically difficult cases. Since that onus is no less severe when the patent issue arises
in the defense, or is hidden in the plaintiff's complaint, it is difficult to believe that the
legislature understood that its use of the phrase "arising under" would circumscribe the
CAFC's authority.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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U.S.C. § 1331, and is interpreted differently.1 52 Thus, the phrase is
susceptible to differing interpretations depending on the context in
which it is used.153 Moreover, when the "arising under" language
was incorporated into § 1331, nearly fifty years after it was put in the
Constitution, all indications were that Congress' intention was to
confer the full constitutional power upon the federal courts.M
Yet another reason the identical phraseology argument does not
mandate identical application of the two sections is that certain
jurisdictional dilemmas facing the Federal Circuit never arose before
the advent of the court. For instance, there were never pendent
claims which could modify the jurisdiction of the court before the
creation of the Federal Circuit,'55 and therefore existing "arising
under" analysis cannot be dispositive. Similarly, the jurisdictional
issues that attend consolidation of cases filed in district courts were
unknown prior to the formation of the Federal Circuit 56 There-
fore, traditional well-pleaded complaint analysis does not anticipate
such jurisdictional situations.
It is not clear how broad the Supreme Court intended its analysis
to be. The primary jurisdiction issue presented to the Court in
Christianson was a narrow one-whether the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction could be determined after a trial.15 7 The Court properly
rejected this approach. 58  There was no defense, counterclaim, or
other pleading, however, upon which Federal Circuit jurisdiction
could have been predicated. 59
152. See infra part II.B.2.a (discussing "arising under" jurisdiction).
153. "'[S]ubstantial identity of the words' in the constitutional and statutory grants of federal-
question jurisdiction 'does not, of course, require on that score alone, an identical interpreta-
tion."' National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-Water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 613 (1949) (Rutledge,
J., concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Harry Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some
Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure 45 YALE LJ. 393, 405 n.47 (1936)).
154. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 25, at 160 & n.22 (noting limited availability of legislative
history, citing other sources emphasizing the inaccessibility of congressional data, and
concluding that "the expressed intention [was] to confer all the 'judicial power' authorized by
the Constitution on the federal courts"); Note, supra note 46, at 988-89 (stating that "statutory
adoption of constitutional language manifestly links the 'meaning' of the statute to that of the
constitution"); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 568 (1985)
(finding that legislative history of 1875 Act establishing federal question jurisdiction indicates
that it was intended to be as broad as Constitution would allow).
155. See infra notes 369-73 and accompanying text (listing causes of action that Federal
Circuit has determined to be related to patents).
156. See infra notes 318-20 and accompanying text (discussing unique issue of whether both
complaints should be considered in making jurisdiction decision).
157. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988).
158. Id. at 813-14.
159. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1548, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1241, 1242-43 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (listingparties' pleadings), vacated and remanded, 486 U.S.
800 (1988).
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b. Legislative history
In addition to the identical phraseology of the two sections, the
Court relied on the legislative history which explains that cases fall
within the Federal Circuit's patentjurisdiction "in the same sense that
cases are said to 'arise under' federal law for the purposes of federal
question jurisdiction.""6
The legislative history is susceptible to varying interpretations.
161
The snippet of legislative history relied upon by the Supreme Court
in Christianson and by the Federal Circuit in Atari, Inc. v. JS & A
Group, Inc., 162 taken in context, is not instructive.
In emphasizing that "traditional" arising under analysis applies to
Federal Circuitjurisdictional determinations, Congress was contrasting
"traditional" jurisdictional analysis with the jurisdiction of the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals ("TECA").'" However,
TECA has "issue" jurisdiction."6  Thus, the legislative history
indicates that Congress rejected "issue" jurisdiction as a possibility for
the Federal Circuit." It is not, however, a strong indication that
Congress intended the well-pleaded complaint rule to apply without
modification. 66
Furthermore, the House and Senate reports explain that one of the
Congressional objectives in creating the Federal Circuitwas "to reduce
the widespread lack of uniformity and uncertainty of legal doctrine
that exist in the administration of patent law." 67 Accordingly, the
160. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 814 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 87, at 41).
161. See Dreyfuss, supra note 151, at 35 n.207 (noting ambiguity between Congress'
expectation that Federal Circuit's jurisdiction would be restricted and testimony before Congress
that urged Federal Circuit not to miss "true" patent cases hidden in artful pleadings).
162. 747 F.2d 1422, 1428, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
163. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 87, at 41.
164. Texas Am. Oil Corp. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (in banc); see Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604 F.2d 179,
186-87 (2d Cir. 1979). The court in Coastal States indicated three options for TECAjurisdiction:
(1) traditional "arising under"jurisdiction; (2) casejurisdiction over all cases involvingEconomic
Stabilization Act issues, even if not raised by the well-pleaded complaint; or (3) issuejurisdiction.
Id. at 182. The court concluded that the TECA has issue jurisdiction. Id.
165. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 87, at 41 (verifying Federal Circuit's "arising under"
jurisdiction by contrasting with TECA "issue" jurisdiction).
166. See Hale, supra note 78, at 263 ("[The well-pleaded complaint] rule is inconsistent with
the congressional mandates to avoid bifurcation of appeals, to avoid specialization, and to avoid
forum-shopping.").
167. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 87, at 23; see also S. REP. No. 275, supra note 3, at 5,
repinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. at 15 ("The creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of the law."). The Senate Report also states
that the purpose of the Federal Courts Improvement Act was to provide "a forum for appeals
from throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special
need for national uniformity." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CAN. at 14.
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Federal Circuit should not miss "patent issues merely couched in
antitrust terms."'" Thus, providing the Federal Circuit with jurisdic-
tion over cases in which an issue of patent law is actually present
rather than a strict adherence to the well-pleaded complaint rule
would further Congress' goal.'69
Moreover, the legislative history does not indicate that the well-
pleaded complaint rule should apply to § 1338; it merely states that
cases fall within the Federal Circuit's patent jurisdiction "in the same
sense that cases are said to 'arise under' federal law for the purposes
of federal question jurisdiction.'"170 It is doubtful that Congress
appreciated the nuances of the traditional "arising under" analysis and
insisted on their application to Federal Circuitjurisdictional determi-
nations. In fact, rather than get involved in such determinations,
Congress left it to the courts to "establish, as they have in similar
situations, jurisdictional guidelines."'1'
2. Distortions created by strict application of the Christianson rule
If the Christianson rule on § 1338 jurisdiction is read to require
strict application of federal question precedent principles, the rule
would result, as stated by the Federal Circuit, in a "Procrustean bed"
for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. 172
a. 'Arising under" analysis
The Supreme Court, in deciding that traditional "arising under"
jurisdictional analysis applies to the determination of the Federal
Circuit's jurisdiction, imposed a system that developed in the context
of state versus federal jurisdictional problems and applied it in a
federal versus federal context. 73 That is, traditional "arising under"
principles arose in the context of determining whether federal courts
or state courts have jurisdiction over a dispute. 174 In the context of
168. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 3, at 37-38, repinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 46-47.
169. See Hale, supra note 78, at 263-65 (suggesting that uniformity in patent law and
reduction in forum shopping would result if Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over all cases with
patent issues). Of course, the Federal Circuit is correct in that it is not necessary for it to have
jurisdiction over eveoy case in which an issue of patent law is raised for the Federal Circuit to
create uniformity. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1074, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
170. H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 87, at 41.
171. l&
172. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
741, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
173. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807-10 (1988).
174. Examples of traditional "arising under" analysis include Wade v. Lauder, 165 U.S. 624,
627-28 (1897); Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt 125 U.S. 46, 52 (1888); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S.
613, 616-17 (1883); Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547,552-54 (1878); Wilson v. Sanford, 51 U.S.
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conflicts over the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, it frequently is clear
that the dispute properly lies in the federal judiciary; 5 the only
question is which circuit court should resolve the dispute. 7 '
The rationale behind providing a federal forum for the vindication
of federal rights has been the subject of extensive discussion. It was
believed that a federal judiciary would foster the important and
necessary goal "of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United
States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution." '177
It was also believed that federal judges, complete with the federal
judicial appointment system and accompanying insulation and circuit
court judicial review, would be more sympathetic and more likely to
give full scope to Supreme Court decisions. 78 The federal judiciary
specializes in the application of federal law, thereby developing an
expertise in the area. 79 State courts, by comparison, have little
experience with federal law.'
80
(10 How.) 99, 101-02 (1850).
175. SeeWyden v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934,935-36,231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 918, 919-20 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding suit was properly in federal court under 35 U.S.C.
§ 32, and only issue was whether it was patent case); Dubost v. United States Patent &
Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1564-65, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding suit was properly in district court under 48 U.S.C. § 1338(a), and jurisdictional issue
concerned appropriate circuit court for appeal).
176. Federal Circuitjurisdiction problems arise in the traditional state versus federal context
in addition to the federal versus federal context. See Vink v. Schijf, 839 F.2d 676, 678-79, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1728, 1730-31 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (determining whether suit was either action
for ownership under state law or patent infringement under federal law); C.R Bard, Inc. v.
Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879-82, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 201-04 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (deciding
whether suit was contract action under state law or patent infringement suit under federal law).
Traditional "arising under" analysis applies to these determinations as it always has. The
Supreme Court has explained:
Federal courts have no right, irrespective of citizenship, to entertain suits for the
amount of an agreed license, or royalty, or for the specific execution of a contract for
the use of a patent, or of other suits where a subsisting contract is shown governing the
rights of the party in the use of an invention, and that such suits not only may, but
must, be brought in the state courts.
Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 260 (1897). For examples of traditional
"arising under" analysis, see supra note 174.
177. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816); see also Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 826 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (believing that
although perfect uniformity may not have been achieved, availability of federal forum in federal
question cases has advanced that goal); Richard E. Levy, Comment, Federal Preemption, Removal
Jurisdiction, and the Well-Pleaded ComplaintRule 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 634,636 (1984) (stating federal
question jurisdiction "helps insure uniformity in the construction and interpretation of federal
law"); Mishkin, supra note 25, at 158 (stating that "sympathetic" application of Supreme Court
decisions by lower federal courts helps achieve "widespread, uniform effectuation of federal
law).
178. See Mishkin, supra note 25, at 158 (suggesting federal judges are more likely than state
judges to apply Supreme Court decisions that may be unpopular locally).
179. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF THE DIVISION OFJURISDIGInON BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 164-68 (1969) [hereinafter ALI].
180. See id. at 164-65 (noting that considerable expertise in interpretation and application
of federal law would be lost if federal question cases were given to state courts).
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The protection of federal interests is another concern, the belief
being that federal judges will be less hostile than state judges to
federal governmental interests or assertions of federal rights."8'
Reducing geographical bias is also a goal of the federal judiciary,
although this is primarily addressed by providing diversity jurisdic-
tion. 182
Counseling in favor of a narrow interpretation of federal jurisdic-
tion is a general notion of the usurpation of state authority,183 the
concept being that states should be permitted to control the conduct
of their citizens and that state courts should be the final arbiter of
state laws. 1' States should have the authority to adjudicate disputes
and interpret their own law when there is no significant federal
concern. There is also a practical limit on the volume of litigation
that federal courts can effectively manage.'8
In determining whether the Federal Circuit or a regional circuit has
jurisdiction over a case, there is no concern with usurping state
authority because the case will be in the federal judiciary in any event.
Thus, the possibility of an overbroad jurisdictional view is not a
concern. 186  The jurisdictional analyses by the Federal Circuit and
181. See, e.g., MARTIN H. RF.DISH, FEDERALJURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POwER 71 (1980) (stating reason for allocating general authority of federal question
cases to federal courts is to assure presence of fair, sympathetic and expert protector of federal
rights); Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism, judicial Power and the "Arising Under"Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts: A HierarchialAnalysis, 56 IND. LJ. 563,564-65 (1981) (stating original jurisdiction
of federal courts protects federal interests from "state hostility, provincialism and error"); Levy,
supra note 177, at 636 (1984) (finding federal forum would be more conducive to protection
of federally created rights than possibly hostile state court).
182. Although it was recognized that the availability of Supreme Court review for state court
decisions would ameliorate these problems, it was not deemed adequate in view of the state
court's role as a fact finder and the necessarily limited number of cases that the Supreme Court
can review. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416-17
(1964) (stressing importance of fact-finding role and suggesting parties litigate in federal district
court rather than appeal directly to Supreme Court); Levy, supra note 177, at 636 n.10 (noting
impossibility of Supreme Court review of all state court decisions and desirability of obtaining
federal forum through original federal question jurisdiction).
183. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1936); Shoshone Mining Co. v.
Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 508-12 (1900). See generally Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
FederalJudiciar Act ofl789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 53, 65-111, 125-32 (1923) (discussing legislative
history of Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 in detail).
184. In fact, the absence of federal question jurisdiction until 1875 "was not an oversight but
reflected a compromise made necessary by the determined opposition of the antifederalists to
a nationaljudiciary." London, supra note 25, at 836. The belief that federal tribunals would be
impartial made the resolution of disputes by federal tribunals palatable. FEux FRANKFURTER &
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 7-8 (1928).
185. See London, supra note 25, at 839 (commenting that "[t]he national system of courts
... has chronically suffered from the threat of paralysis through glut").
186. There was, at the time of creation of the Federal Circuit, congressional concern that
the Federal Circuit would take too many cases and, in effect, become a "super" circuit. The
Senate Report stated that "[c] oncern has been expressed that the Court of Appeals for the
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regional circuits so far have shown the danger of overbroad jurisdic-
tion to be minimal. In fact, the Federal Circuit has been criticized by
commentators for being too modest in its jurisdictional decisions. 18 7
The interest in uniform interpretation and application of the law, on
the other hand, is even stronger in view of the specific legislative
intent to bring uniformity to patent law by creating the Federal
Circuit.
This distinction makes it difficult to apply the Merrell Dow "nature
of the federal interest"" test to Federal Circuit versus regional
circuit jurisdictional conflicts. Determining the importance of the
federal interest at stake requires that there be some countervailing
consideration."8 9 Because in a Federal Circuit versus regional circuit
dispute there is little interest in preventing the Federal Circuit from
exercising jurisdiction, the patent law interest at stake will always be
"important" or "significant." Thus, the Federal Circuit usually should
have jurisdiction when such disputes arise.
This analysis would not apply when the jurisdiction dispute is
between the Federal Circuit and state courts."9 In such cases the
nature of the federal interest must be determined vis-a-vis the state
interest9 1 Thus, the majority's analysis in Merrell Dow will apply in
toto in determining whether the case properly belongs in federal
court. One could argue that the creation of the Federal Circuit, as
well as the recent passage of federal legislation in the intellectual
Federal Circuit will appropriate for itself elements of Federal law under its section 1295(1) grant
ofjurisdiction." S. REP. No. 275, supra note 3, at 19, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.CA.N. at 29, The
House Report noted that there was concern that the "'in part' jurisdiction of the (Federal
Circuit] ... will be a locomotive that will pull all sorts of related issues into the terminal of the
court's appellate jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 312, supra note 87, at 41. But see Kennedy v.
Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 966, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1467, 1468 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that cases
involving questions of mere ownership of patents may be adjudicated more appropriately by
regional circuit courts but concluding that cases involving both validity and ownership of patent
are handled more appropriately by Federal Circuit).
187. See Dreyfuss, supra note 151, at 35-37 (stating that Supreme Court's failure to extend
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to every claim involving patent was "especially surprising"); Hale,
supra note 78, at 263-65 (stating that Federal Circuit should not be bound by well-pleaded
complaint rule, but should return to "original ingredient" test).
188. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814-15 n.12 (1988)
(noting that many federal causes of action were not properly brought under federal question
jurisdiction because of predominance of state law claims); see supra text accompanying notes 58-
68 (describing tension between state's interest in maintainingjurisdiction over cases and federal
interest in maintaining jurisdiction over cases in which federal law is ingredient).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68 (explaining that federal court can usurp
jurisdiction from states only when federal claim is sufficient to overcome countervailing state
claim).
190. See supra note 14 (discussing cases involving resolution of federal versus state
jurisdictional claims).
191. See supra part III.B.2.a (describing application of "arising under"jurisdiction).
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property area, show a heightened federal interest in this area. 92
This heightened interest, the argument goes, provides federal
questionjurisdiction under the MerrellDow analysis whenever a patent
law question is raised, thus providing the Federal Circuit with
jurisdiction over such cases. 9 Given the long history of denying
federal jurisdiction in contract and other state law actions even when
a construction of patent law is at issue,' it is doubtful that such an
argument would be successful.
b. The well-pleaded complaint rule
Whether a case arises under § 1338 or § 1331 is determined by
looking to the well-pleaded complaint rule.'95 The rationale behind
the well-pleaded complaint rule is that a court and litigants should be
able to determine at the outset of the trial which law applies. 96 As
with "arising under" jurisdiction, this case law arose in the context of
disputes over whether cases belonged in the federal or state judicial
system.' 97 The outcome of the determination could change the
court system in which the dispute would be litigated. 98 The poten-
tial waste of judicial resources and the resources of the parties is
obvious. Determining jurisdiction at the earliest point in the
192. See Shawn K. Baldwin, Comment, "To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts"." A
Role for Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property as Collateral, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1727-28
(1995) (arguing that there is "strong federal interest[]" in regulating use of intellectual proper-
ty); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate 72
VA. L. REV. 677, 687 (1986) (noting that there are two competing federal interests implicated
by intellectual property:. (1) stimulating innovation; and (2) advancing public access).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 173-82 (explaining that "arising under" analysis
involves evaluation of importance of federal interest at stake).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59 (arguing that Supreme Court recognized state
interest in being final arbiter in decisions of state law when it denied federal jurisdiction in
Merrell Dow).
195. See supra text accompanying note 10 (describing two part test: (1) does it appear from
well-pleaded complaint that (2) case arises under federal law).
196. Atari, Inc. v.JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1432, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1081
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that "[t]o impart certainty throughout the entire process of filing, pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial motions, appellate jurisdiction should normally be known and remain
unaffected:'); see Dreyfuss, supra note 151, at 36 (observing that rationale for well-pleaded
complaint rule is as mechanism to determine quickly whether federal court has jurisdiction).
197. See Amy B. Cohen, "Arising Under"Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws 44 HASTINGS LJ.
337, 339-40 & n.11 (1993) (noting that question of whether federal or state court has
jurisdiction depends on whether case "arises under" patent law or, more broadly, laws of United
States).
198. See Mary P. Twitchell, Charactering Federal Claims: Preemption, Removal and the Arising-
UnderJurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 812, 813 (1986) (stating that "[i]f
plaintiffs claim can be said to 'arise under' federal law, the federal courts can hear the case; if
not, the dispute must be left in state court.").
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proceedings thus furthers judicial efficiency while minimizing waste
to the parties. 19
Jurisdictional determinations in cases brought under 35 U.S.C.
§ 1338 are unlike traditional jurisdictional determinations in that
when there is a federal circuit versus regional circuit jurisdictional
dispute, the trial forum will not change.200 Thus, the policy con-
cerns in favor of following the well-pleaded complaint rule to choose
a forum at the outset of the trial do not apply in a federal versus
federal context.
In addition, district courts should not have to modify the law they
apply based on the appellate forum. Since the formation of the
Federal Circuit, appeals from district courts may be taken to regional
circuits or the Federal Circuit, depending on the subject matter of the
case. 21  Thus, district courts have two possible bodies of binding
precedent.20 2  Believing that this was an untenable position for
district courts and litigants, the Federal Circuit early on decided that
it stood in a better position to adjust which law it would apply, rather
than leave it for each district court to follow two separate bodies of
procedural law.203
In procedural matters and substantive matters over which it does
not have exclusive jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit applies regional
circuit law, while in matters involving substantive patent law, it follows
Federal Circuit precedent.2° The Federal Circuit may have assumed
(and properly so) that regional circuit courts would apply the
substantive law of the Federal Circuit to patent law issues that came
before them.05 While this assumption has not always proven
199. See id. at 821-22 (recognizing possible benefits in clarity and efficiency of well-pleaded
complaint rule).
200. See Dreyfuss, supra note 151, at 7 (stating that Federal Courts Improvement Act offered
solution to forum shopping problem by creating single forum to hear patent appeals).
201. See Dreyfuss, supra note 151, at 46-47 (noting that both Federal Circuit and regional
circuits hear interlocutory appeals).
202. See Brian S. Tomko, Comment, Scripps or Atlantic: The Federal Circuit Squares Off Over the
Scope of Product-b)yProcess Patents, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1693, 1695 (1995) (recounting conflict over
interpretation of precedent).
203. SeePanduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
465, 470-72 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (ruling as matter of law that procedural issues not unique to patent
claims shall be decided according to law of regional circuit). The Federal Circuit has been
criticized for not developing its own body of procedural and substantive law. Dreyfuss, supra
note 151, at 37-46.
204. Panduit Corp., 744 F.2d at 1574-76, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 470-72.
205. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1440 n.15, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1074, 1087 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (declining to explore issue, but noting that regional circuits,
confronted with need to decide certain questions of law, may find it useful to refer to Federal
Circuit precedent).
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correct,20 6 there is little indication that the regional circuits have
addressed the matter. When they do, the substantive patent law at
the Federal Circuit should be applied. °7
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRcuIT'S TREATMENT OF § 1338 JURISDICTION
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AN IMPROVED CRRSTIANSON RULE
A. The Application of the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule by the Federal
Circuit
As discussed earlier, under the traditional well-pleaded complaint
rule analysis, "arising under" jurisdiction is determined solely by the
contents of the "well-pleaded complaint. 20 ' The well-pleaded
complaint cannot anticipate defenses, even if those defenses are
virtually certain to arise.2°
Courts and litigants will benefit most if a bright line can be drawn
to insure predictability of the appellate forum, even if the bright line
permits some patent issues to go to regional circuits and some non-
patent issues to be appealed to the Federal Circuit.2 10  The more
malleable jurisdictional approach the Federal Circuit is presently using
advantageously permits the Federal Circuit to review more patent
issues and fewer issues not within its exclusive jurisdiction.2 1 ' The
206. See, e.g., Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167, 171 (6th Cir. 1985)
(relying on Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit precedent to evaluate validity of patent); National
Business Sys., Inc. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 743 F.2d 1227, 1231-36 (7th Cir. 1984) (evaluating validity
of patent under Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuit precedent); Hand Gards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc.,
743 F.2d 1282, 1285-87 (9th Cir. 1984) (exercising jurisdiction despite existence of Federal
Circuit), cert. denia, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1327
& n.1 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting regional circuits soon will have to cede jurisdiction of patent
claims to Federal Circuit, but retaining jurisdiction because appeal was filed prior to effective
date of Federal Courts Improvement Act). But see Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
870 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Although we recognize that the Federal Circuit's
decision does not bind us .... the recognition that Congress created the Federal Circuit with
the goal of achieving uniformity and coherence in the patent laws counsel[s] us against straying
far from the court's thorough analysis... " (citation omitted)), on remand from 486 U.S. 800
(1988).
207. Congress' intention in creating the Federal Circuit was to unify patent law. S. REP. No.
275, supra note 3, at 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15-17. This intent can best be
achieved if regional circuit courts apply the Federal Circuit's precedent in substantive areas of
the law over which the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction.
208. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (arguing that controversy at hand must be
clearly presented on face of complaint).
209. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating that federaljurisdiction will not attach
merely because claim anticipates defense raising federal question).
210. See Kennedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 1988) (advocating bright line test for
determining jurisdiction of Federal Circuit vis-t-vis regional circuit courts).
211. SeeSteven R. Trybus, Comment, Federal CircuitJurisdiction: This Court, That Law, 61 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 731, 732 (1985) (noting that Federal Circuit has construed Federal Court
Improvement Act to allow application of Federal Circuit precedent to patent claims, and
regional circuit precedent to non-patent claims).
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Federal Circuit, however, does not need to review every patent case to
achieve uniformity in patent law,212 and, as a co-equal member of
the system of thirteen appellate courts, it is competent to review any
issue that may arise on appeal.18 The predictability provided by a
bright line rule, therefore, coupled with the inherent saving of time
and expense to litigants and increased judicial efficiency, outweighs
the disadvantage of the Federal Circuit declining to review a small
number of appeals not involving patent issues.
1. Jurisdiction based on a counterclaim
Although it is likely that under the traditional application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule a counterclaim will not provide a basis for
federal jurisdiction, the question of whether a counterclaim should be
taken into account in determining the jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit is a difficult one. There are persuasive reasons for not extend-
ing the traditional notions of the well-pleaded complaint rule to
determine the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. The number of
cases involving patent issues could be significant, thus thwarting
Congress' goals in establishing the Federal Circuit.214 As discussed
above, because many of these cases would remain within the federal
system otherwise, there is no real interest in avoiding Federal Circuit
jurisdiction.1 5 Compulsory counterclaims are distinct from permis-
sive counterclaims and must be analyzed separately for reasons which
will become apparent.
The Federal Circuit in banc has held that a compulsory counter-
claim can provide the basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction under
§ 1295 or § 1338.216 In Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works,
Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd.,217 the Federal Circuit affirmatively held what
it had described in dictum in earlier cases, that is, that traditional
212. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1432, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074,
1081 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing that Congress was not concerned that occasional patent law
decision by regional circuits would destroy uniformity).
213. Kennedy, 851 F.2d at 967 (concluding that because under Christianson regional court
could end up deciding patent issue, "it follows that the Federal Circuit ends up with non-patent
issues").
214. SeeAerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, Oerlikon-Buehrle, Ltd., 895 F.2d 736,
744, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670, 1677 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (in banc) ("Directing appeals involving
compulsory counterclaims for patent infringement to the twelve regional circuits could frustrate
Congress' desire to foster uniformity and preclude forum shopping.").
215. See supra text accompanying notes 175-86 (arguing that Federal Circuit jurisdictional
determinations involve federal versus federal, not federal versus state tensions).
216. See Aerjet, 895 F.2d at 744-45, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677-78 (holding, under § 1295,
that Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over case in which counterclaim, but not complaint, was
based on § 1338).
217. 895 F.2d 736, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (in banc).
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notions of the well-pleaded complaint rule did not bar the Federal
Circuit from hearing a case properly in federal district court where a
counterclaim interjected a patent claim into the case for the first
time. 18 The court expressly reserved decision on whether a permis-
sive counterclaim could likewise be the basis for Federal Circuit
jurisdiction even though jurisdiction for the complaint was not based
in whole or in part on § 1338.219
In Aerojet, plaintiff Aerojet sued Machine Tool Works for unfair
competition, interference with prospective advantage, false representa-
tion, and a declaratory judgment that its trade secrets were not
misappropriated.220 Jurisdiction was based on federal question and
diversity of citizenship.22' Machine Tool Works answered and coun-
terclaimed for, inter alia, patent infringement.2 2 On appeal from
a district court interlocutory order, the Federal Circuit ordered the
case in banc on the question: "[D]oes this court have jurisdiction to
hear an appeal in a case in which the district court's jurisdiction over
the complaint was not based on § 1338(a) but there is a counterclaim
over which the district court would have § 1338 (a) if the counterclaim
had been a complaint?" 23 The court held that it did have jurisdic-
tion.224
The court noted that its decision was foreshadowed in decisions
issued prior to the Christianson decision.2' The Federal Circuit's
decisions in both Schwarzkopf Development Corp. v. Ti-Coating, Inc.26
and In re Innotron Diagostics,227 indicated that, were the issue
squarely presented, the court would have held a counterclaim could
confer jurisdiction.2
The Federal Circuit distinguished Christianson on two grounds,
noting that first, a counterclaim can provide jurisdiction under the
well-pleaded complaint rule;229 and second, that Christianson did not
218. See id at 741-44, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675-77 (citing Supreme Court and circuit
court dicta stating generally that well-pleaded complaint rule is not meant to be "procrustean
bed" that prevents court from hearing claims properly before it merely because counterclaim
interjects patent issue).
219. Id. at 739, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
220. Id. at 737, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
221. Id. at 738, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
222. Id., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
223. Id., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
224. I. at 745, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
225. See id. at 739-41, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673-75 (citing pre-Christianson dicta).
226. 800 F.2d 240, 245, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that the
counterclaim was dismissed so court did not have to rule on jurisdictional question).
227. 800 F.2d 1077, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 178 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
228. See Aernjet, 895 F.2d at 741, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (stating that court holding
accords with Schwarzkopf and Innotron).
229. Id. at 742, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
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require strict compliance with the well-pleaded complaint rule.230
The second ground is more persuasive than the first.
As to the first rationale, there is support for sustaining jurisdiction
based on a counterclaim under the traditional application of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.23' The more accepted rule, however,
and the rule supported by the weight of authority, holds that a
counterclaim cannot provide the basis for federal jurisdiction.32
The Federal Circuit's second ground for distinguishing Christian-
son-that it did not prohibit a modification of the traditional well-
pleaded complaint rule as used in federal question jurisdiction
cases-is more persuasive. The Federal Circuit noted: (1) that a
counterclaim was not at issue in Christianson;233 (2) that the context
of the dispute was "not state/federal but federal/federal," and thus,
the reasoning behind the well-pleaded complaint rule was not as
compelling;21 and (3) that the legislative history behind the cre-
ation of the court and 28 U.S.C. § 1295 supported the view that
counterclaims could provide a basis for Federal Circuitjurisdiction on
appeal. 2 5
230. Id.
231. See e.g., Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 539-40 (3d Cir.) (holding
jurisdictional defect in claim will not foreclose adjudication when counterclaim states
independent basis forjurisdiction), cert. denieA, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981); Duncan v. First Nat'l Bank,
597 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating in dicta and without analysis that district court attained
jurisdiction over suit to quiet title by virtue of government's equitable counterclaim); Great
Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1961) (stating
compulsory counterclaim can form basis of federal jurisdiction, at least after dismissal of
plaintiffs claim, which lacked basis for federal jurisdiction); Corporation Venezolana de
Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 477 F. Supp. 615, 617, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding that court
lacked jurisdiction based on plaintiff's claims, but acquired it by virtue of defendant's
counterclaims), rev'd on other grounds, 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 1080
(1980); Wong v. Bacon, 445 F. Supp. 1177, 1183-84 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that when district
court has jurisdiction of counterclaim, it does not losejurisdiction by dismissing original claim);
see also First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417, 423 (1st Cir. 1979) (holding
district court properly retained jurisdiction when parallel counterclaim was pending in state
court), cited with approval in Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S.
1, 20 n.20, 22 n.24 (1982).
232. Rath Packing Co. v. Becker, 530 F.2d 1295, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Removability
cannot be created by defendant pleading a counter-claim presenting a federal question under
28 U.S.C. § 1338."), affid on other grounds sub nom. 430 U.S. 519, and reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 925
(1977); see also 1 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACnCE 0.62[6], at 692 (2d
ed. 1996) ("The charge of infringement must appear in the complaint, and not by way of
defense or counterclaim ... ."); 14A WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 76, § 3722, at 258-60 ("It is
insufficient that a federal question has been raised as a... counterclaim."). See generally STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1312 (1969)
(suggesting that either party asserting or party defending against counterclaim that is
compulsory under state law and raises substantial federal claim be allowed to remove entire
action).
233. See Aerojet, 895 F.2d at 744, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (noting that only relevant
pleadings in Christianson were complaint and answer).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 74445, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
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Although the court's reasoning in Aerojet is ultimately persuasive,
the case is not as easy as the court makes it out to be. Christianson
actually lends support to the rule that a counterclaim cannot provide
the basis for jurisdiction. The issue addressed in Christianson was
whether there was an implied amendment to the pleadings under
Rule 15(b). 36 The Court recognized that "the summary judgment
papers focused almost entirely on the patent-law issues, which
[Christianson] deemed '[b]asic and fundamental to the subject
lawsuit.' But those issues fell squarely within the purview of the
theories of recovery, defenses, and counterclaims that the pleadings
already encompassed." 7 This statement implies that the counter-
claim cannot form the basis for jurisdiction.23
Moreover, the legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement
Act mentions counterclaims as a basis for § 1338 jurisdiction but
presents no strong indication as to the legislative intent. The Senate
Report provides:
Federal Districtjudges are encouraged to use their authority under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Rules 13(i), 16, 20(b),
42(b), 54(b), to ensure the integrity of the jurisdiction of the
federal court of appeals by separating final decisions on claims
involving substantial antitrust issues from trivial patent claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims, or third party claims raised to manipu-
late appellate jurisdiction. 9
It could be argued that this indicates Congress did not want the
Federal Circuit to base its jurisdiction on counterclaims; however, it
is likely that the emphasis in the quoted passage should be on "trivial"
and "raised to manipulate appellate jurisdiction."24°  The implica-
tion therefore would be that non-trivial counterclaims which are not
raised to manipulate appellate jurisdiction should provide a basis for
appellate jurisdiction.
236. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 814-15 (1988); see also FED.
R. CIv. P. 15(b) ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the
pleadings.").
237. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 815 (emphasis added) (citation to appendix omitted).
238. In fact, the counterclaims in Christianson were for state unfair trade claims. Christianson,
822 F.2d 1545, 1548, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Thus, the Court in
Christianson was not presented with the possibility ofjurisdiction based on a counterclaim. The
statements made to this effect, therefore, are not part of the holding and likely are not
indicative of the Court's predisposition as to whether a counterclaim could provide a basis for
§ 1338 jurisdicdon.
239. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 3, at 20, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C-A.N. at 30.
240. S. REP. No. 275, supra note 3, at 20, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 30.
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Finally, Aeriet involved a compulsory counterclaim. Such a claim,
that is, one arising out of the same transaction or occurrence,
241
must be asserted in the pending case or it will be barred in later
actions.242 A compulsory counterclaim is similar to a defense in that
it is necessarily closely related to the case and it requires no indepen-
dent jurisdictional basis.24  It is considered within the ancillary
jurisdiction of the court.244 In fact, a defense in a patent lawsuit can
often be recharacterized as a counterclaim.24
It is therefore somewhat anomalous to permit a compulsory
counterclaim to provide a basis for § 1338jurisdiction when a defense
cannot. This, in some circumstances, emphasizes form over sub-
stance. Also, given that a compulsory counterclaim does not require
an independent jurisdictional basis, basing jurisdiction on a counter-
claim does not satisfy the literal language of § 1295 because the
district court's jurisdiction is not based "in part" on § 1338.46
Permitting a compulsory counterclaim to provide the basis for
jurisdiction when a case would otherwise be tried in state court runs
contrary to the principles that "the party who brings a suit is master
241. See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1202 (2nd Cir. 1970)
(holding federal appellate jurisdiction exists when compulsory counterclaim is transactionally
related to original claim); Kissell Co. v. Farley, 417 F.2d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 1969) (dismissing
action due to plaintiffs attempt to raise transactionally-related counterclaim that he had failed
to raise during original proceeding); Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d
631, 634 (3d Cir. 1961) (holding that because it arose from same occurrence, plaintiffs
counterclaim to defendant's counterclaim was compulsory and therefore within appellate court's
jurisdiction); Dow Chem. Co. v. Metlon Corp., 281 F.2d 292, 296 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding that
party invoking jurisdiction of federal court may not attempt to limit jurisdiction in answer of
counterclaim that arises out of same factual backdrop); Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276
F.2d 468,471 (9th Cir. 1960) (holding that federal appellatejurisdiction survives lack of diversity
of citizenship when counterclaim arises out of same transaction as original claim); United Artists
Corp. v. Masterpiece Prod., Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that counterclaim
joining additional defendants in single copyright suit was "compulsory counterclaim" and
therefore required no independent jurisdictional basis). See generally 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT Elr
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1417, at 136 (1990) (asserting that "compulsory
counterclaim" is one arising out of same facts or circumstances as original claim).
242. See generally 6 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 241, § 1417, at 140-41 (noting that failure to
raise compulsory counterclaim bars party from ever asserting claim in independent action).
243. See Great Lakes Rubber Corp., 286 F.2d at 633 (holding compulsory counterclaim is one
that arises out of same transaction of occurrence that forms subject matter of opposing party's
claim).
244. See Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 n.l (1974) (noting that if
counterclaim is compulsory, court will have ancillary jurisdiction over it, although it might be
matter for state court).
245. For example, in Schwazkopf, a suit filed for reformation of a license agreement, both
a defense and a counterclaim for patent invalidity were raised. Schwarzkopf Dev. Corp. v. Ti-
Coating Inc., 800 F.2d 240, 241, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 47, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
246. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (conferring on Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over
claims "based, in whole or in part, on Section 1338"). Section 1338 confers on district courts
original jurisdiction over, inter alia, cases arising under an act of Congress relating to patent or
copyright laws. Id. § 1338(a). Such jurisdiction is "exclusive of the courts of the states." I&
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to decide what law he will rely upon," 47 and that "U]urisdiction
generally depends upon the case made and the relief demanded by
the plaintiff."2" Disputes over licensing agreements often arise as
breach of contract actions which are controlled by state law. If a
compulsory counterclaim were permitted to be the basis for federal
jurisdiction, when a contract action is filed for breach of a license and
the defendant defends based on invalidity, the suit will remain in state
court.2 49  If, however, the defendant files a counterclaim seeking a
declaration of invalidity, the suit properly may be removed to federal
court.
25 0
When the jurisdictional choice is federal versus federal, as it was in
Aerojet, there is no opportunity for the plaintiff to choose the forum
or decide what law he will rely upon. Congress intended that the
Federal Circuit would have jurisdiction over cases raising the subject
matter of the counterclaim, and, as explained earlier, the Federal
Circuit is competent to review the subject matter of the com-
plaint.25' Thus, taking the appeal to the Federal Circuit fosters
Congress' goal. Furthermore, the law applied theoretically (and
usually practically) will be the same.252
Thus, compulsory counterclaims should be permitted to provide a
basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction when the case is otherwise
properly in federal court, but should not provide ajurisdictional basis
when the suit would go to a state court. In view of the interest in
providing the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over patent cases, and
the lack of countervailiig interests, the anomaly with respect to
defenses253 should be permitted to exist.
247. Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22,25 (1913); accord Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 683 (1946) (holding that when both state and federal grounds are available, plaintiff may
rely solely on federal grounds).
248. Healy v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915).
249. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 16 (1983)
(holding that"'if, but for the availability of the declaratoryjudgment procedure, the claim would
arise only as a defense to a state created action, jurisdiction is lacking."' (quoting WRIGHT, ET
AL., supra note 241, § 2767, at 74445)).
250. See id. at 7-8 ("Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.'" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982))).
251. See supra part Ill.B.1.b (asserting that one of Congress' intentions in creating Federal
Circuit was to foster uniform application of patent laws).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 186-89 (stating that federal interest in uniformity
should play major role in federal versus federal jurisdictional decisions).
253. The situation is not completely anomalous because counterclaims, of course, are not
identical to defenses. One difference is that a counterclaim contains an affirmative request for
relief, but a defense does not. Congress intended that such affirmative requests be reviewed by
the Federal Circuit.
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Any claim the defendant may have against the plaintiff which is not
compulsory is termed a permissive counterclaim. A permissive
counterclaim must have an independent jurisdictional basis." If a
permissive counterclaim were able to provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction, this could undermine the principle that the plaintiff may
choose the forum and could give rise to forum shopping. Because
permissive counterclaims must have an independent jurisdictional
basis, however, the opportunity to manipulate appellate jurisdiction
will be minimal. That is, there will be only a limited number of
circumstances in which a party has an independent basis for bringing
a counterclaim which arises under the patent law in order to
manipulate appellate jurisdiction.
Because pleading a permissive counterclaim is, by definition, not
mandatory, many of the concerns addressed by the case law involving
compulsory counterclaims are not applicable to instances involving
permissive counterclaims.255 As a practical matter, a permissive
counterclaim would not be asserted as a basis for federal jurisdiction
under the traditional analysis. If the suit is filed in federal court, it
is the defendant who will argue that there is a lack of federal
jurisdiction. Such a defendant would not assert a permissive
counterclaim before so arguing. If the suit were in state court, it is
the defendant who would have to remove it.25 A defendant remov-
ing an action would not impose a permissive federal counterclaim
before doing so. Also, there is little chance a state court would accept
jurisdiction over a permissive counterclaim raising only a federal
issue.257 Thus, the Federal Circuit need not distinguish the tradition-
al counterclaim precedent in determining whether to accept
jurisdiction based on a permissive counterclaim. Thus, when a
permissive counterclaim states a claim for relief which arises under
the patent law, it should provide a basis for Federal Circuit jurisdic-
tion. As discussed above, in most instances, such a case would be
brought in federal court, regardless, 8 and therefore the plaintiff's
254. See 6 WRIGHT Er AL, supra note 241, § 1422, at 170 (noting that federal courts
consistently hold that permissive claims must have independent grounds for federaljurisdiction).
255. See 6 WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 241, § 1422, at 170 (noting that counterclaims must
have separate jurisdictional basis).
256. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
257. There is also some question as to whether a state court could grant affirmative relief for
patent invalidity, as that issue is exclusively federal.
258. See infra text accompanying notes 300-03 (citing GemvetoJewelry Co. v.Jeff Cooler Inc.,
800 F.2d 256, 230 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 876 (Fed. Cir. 1986), in which Federal Circuit maintained
jurisdiction over case in which only non-pendant claims were appealed).
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interest in choosing the forum and the law on which it will rely is not
relevant 259
Accordingly, permissive counterclaims which state a claim "arising
under" the patent laws should provide a basis for Federal Circuit
jurisdiction. Compulsory counterclaims should provide a basis for
Federal Circuitjurisdiction only in federal versus federal jurisdictional
disputes and not in state versus federal disputes.
2. Juisdiction based on an amended complaint
In Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp.,21u MCV Inc. v. King-Seeley
Thermos Co.,261 and Vink v. Schiff,262 the Federal Circuit accepted
jurisdiction over appeals based on amended complaints.26 The
court offered little discussion of whether an amended complaint is
properly considered in determining subject matter jurisdiction.
The federal rules are liberal in permitting amendments to
pleadings.2" In some limited circumstances, amendments to
pleadings are a matter of right,2" but otherwise leave of the court
259. See infra text accompanying notes 313-17 (analogizingjurisdiction based on counterclaim
to pendent jurisdiction in which plaintiffs "would ordinarily expect to try" claims in single
proceeding (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibb, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))).
260. 790 F.2d 874, 876 n.3, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 668, 670 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (accepting
jurisdiction over patent claim amended to include infringement after district and appellate court
decisions on state law issues).
261. 870 F.2d 1568,1570-71, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1287, 1289-90 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (exercising
jurisdiction over complaint amended after close of discovery to include two counts based on
federal law).
262. 839 F.2d 676, 678,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1728, 1730 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal
by district court when plaintiff amended complaint requesting declaratory judgment on
ownership to include infringement).
263. But see Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Corp., 836 F.2d 515, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269
(Fed. Cir. 1987). In Grenholz, a patent infringement count was voluntarily dismissed without
prejudice and summary judgment was granted on a non-patent count. Id. at 518-19, 5
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271-72. The Federal Circuit held:
Gronholz's dismissal of the patent claim constituted an amendment of his complaint.
That amendment left a complaint which consisted of a single, non-patent claim for
unfair competition. Applying the wel-pleaded complaint rule to the complaint then
remaining, we determine that the present suit does not 'arise under' the patent laws
for jurisdictional purposes.
iL at 518,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271; see also Beghin-Say Int'l Inc. v. Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568,
221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1984). In Beghin-Say, the alleged basis for § 1338
jurisdiction was an amended complaint. Id. at 1570,221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1122. The amended
complaint was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, not because an amended
complaint could not provide the basis for jurisdiction, but because it failed to allege a claim
arising under federal law. Id. at 1570-72, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1123-24.
264. See 6 WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 241, § 1473, at 522 (noting language of Rule 15(a) is
broad and permissive, and allows courts to grant amendments liberally).
265. FED. R. Cirv. P. 15(a) (allowing party to amend pleading once "as a matter of course"
subject to certain limitations).
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is required.2" The court, however, has discretion in granting
leave.2"7 Consideration of the amended complaint almost certainly
is proper in determining whether there is jurisdiction for Federal
Circuit review.2"
The Federal Circuit in Eaton stopped short of setting a hard and
fast rule that an amended complaint will always control for jurisdic-
tional purposes.269  The court explained that it will "look to the
circumstances surrounding the addition of the patent infringement
claim to the complaint as well as the factors enumerated in Atari to
determine the propriety of assuming jurisdiction over all of the claims
in [the] appeal."27 °
A bright line rule that an amended complaint will control for
determining jurisdiction should have been fashioned in EatonY71
The advantageous increase in predictability is obvious. An amended
complaint supersedes the complaint, leaving the original complaint
to perform no function. 72  Should there be a dispute over the
propriety of an amendment to a complaint, it is appropriately raised
as a challenge to the grant of leave to amend.
266. Id (stating that, unless party amends pleading under circumstances allowing such
amendment "as a matter of course," leave of court is required).
267. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971) (holding
that decision whether to grant leave to amend is within discretion of trial court); Forman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (holding grant or denial of opportunity to amend is within
discretion of district court).
268. See, e.g., O'Bryan v. Chandier, 496 F.2d 403, 412 (10th Cir.) (holding that Supreme
Court precedent was properly considered in determining whether to allow removal of amended
complaint), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974); Victory v. Manning, 128 F.2d 415, 417 (3d Cir.
1942) (holding that "when a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is considered, the court, in disposing of the motion should freely allow amend-
ments to show that there isjurisdiction"); Barlow v. Pep Boys, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 130, 133 (E.D.
Pa. 1985) (holding that complaint arguably stated claim for relief which would make § 1331 or
§ 1334 jurisdiction proper and thus, plaintiff who failed to state basis for district court's
jurisdiction was permitted to amend complaint to state such basis).
269. Eaton Corp. v. Appliance Valves Corp., 790 F.2d 874, 876 n.3, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 668,
670 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting that whether amended complaint controls for jurisdictional
purposes depends on circumstances surrounding addition of claim and propriety of court
assuming jurisdiction over all claims).
270. Id. (citation omitted). In Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1077-78 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the court stated that "[flederal courts have
declined jurisdiction over pendent and ancillary claims in the interests of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to litigants."' (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726 (1966)).
271. In not establishing such a rule, the Federal Circuit was likely trying to preserve its
authority to prevent manipulation of its jurisdiction. See Zenith Radio Corp., 401 U.S. at 330
(stating that grant of leave to amend pleadings is within trial courts discretion and can be
reviewed for error).
272. See 6 WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 241, § 1476, at 556-57 (noting that pleading amended
under Rule 15(a) supersedes pleading it modifies).
273. See Earlie v. Jacobs, 745 F.2d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for leave to amend complaint because
amendment would have delayed trial and prejudiced defendant); Barlow, 625 F. Supp. at 134
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One could argue that an amended complaint should not control
forjurisdictional purposes because § 1295 provides the Federal Circuit
with jurisdiction only when the jurisdiction of the district court is
"based" on § 1338.274 The word "based" could be interpreted to
mean "based when filed."275 The plain language of the statute,
however, does not warrant such an interpretation. When an amended
complaint is permitted, the jurisdiction of the district court is still
"based" on § 1338.
An amendment to a complaint need not be express but may be
implied under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6.2 7  The Court
in Christianson expressly reserved the question of whether such an
"express or implied" amendment to the pleadings could provide a
jurisdictional basis.277 The Court noted that there was no consent
in that case because although "the summary judgment papers focused
almost entirely on the patent-law issues ... those issues fell squarely
within the purview of the theories of recovery, defenses, and
counterclaims that the pleadings already encompassed."
278
3. Withdrawal, severance, or separation of a patent claim
On several occasions the Federal Circuit has reviewed cases
in which the well-pleaded complaint, as originally filed, was
based in part on § 1338, but prior to appeal the § 1338 por-
tion of the case was separated,279  severed,"' or with-
(permitting plaintiff to amend complaint after granting defendant's motion for more definite
statement).
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (stating that Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeal from district court in which jurisdiction was based on § 1338).
275. See, e.g., 3 MOORE Er AL., supra note 232, 1 15.15[3-2], at 15-154 ("[A]n amendment
[of pleading] may not salvage diversity jurisdiction where jurisdiction could not be established
under the facts existing at the outset of the action.").
276. FED. R. COV. P. 15(b) provides:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any
time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues.
Id.
277. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800,814-15 (1988) (explaining
that because there is no evidence of consent among parties to litigate new patent law claims,
there is no need to determine whether "express or implied" amendment to pleadings could
provide jurisdictional basis).
278. .at 815.
279. SeeFED. L Cw. P.42(b) (allowing separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim,
or third party claim when it furthers convenience or will avoid prejudice).
280. See FED. 1L Ciw. P. 21 (allowing severance of any claim against a party). Although
severance typically is used in the misjoinder of parties, it is not limited to that context. See
Wyndham Ass'n v. Bintiiff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir.) (holding that Rule 21 authorizes
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drawn.2"' Atari explicitly reserved these issues, 8 2 and since that
time the court has been groping with them on a case by case basis.
A better approach would be for the Federal Circuit to adopt a "bright
line" rule of looking only to the basis for the district court's jurisdic-
tion in the "case" appealed. The Federal Circuit should not, for the
first time on appeal, deem a complaint amended. The sole exception
to this rule should be a frivolous allegation of patent infringement, or
other patent grounds, in a complaint. Such a rule would ensure
predictability of the proper appellate forum.
In USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc.,2"' the plaintiff filed an
action alleging patent misuse, invalidity, and non-infringement.284
In an amended complaint, an antitrust claim was entered.2" The
patent and antitrust claims were severed for separate trials.8 6
Summary judgment was entered on the patent counts28 7 and an
appeal was taken to the Seventh Circuit (the notice of appeal was filed
before the creation of the Federal Circuit) which affirmed the district
court's invalidity and non-infringement determinations but reversed
the district court's finding that the patent was unenforceable. 288
The district court then resolved the remaining claims, none of which
were based on § 1338, and the district court's opinion was appealed
to the Federal Circuit.28 9
The Federal Circuit, faced with a motion to transfer the case, held
that "[p]olicies of judicial efficiency favor transferring the appeal to
the Seventh Circuit. This case has already been before the Seventh
severance of any claim, even without finding of improper joinder), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977
(1968).
281. As the Federal Circuit has pointed out, "severed" and "separated" are not interchange-
able. SeeAtari, Inc. v.JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1426 n.l, 233 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074,
1076 n.1 (1984) (stating that it is inaccurate and misleading to use "severance" and "separation"
interchangeably); see alsoSpencer, White & Prentis Inc. v. Pfizerlnc., 498 F.2d 358, 362 (2nd Cir.
1974) (concluding that district court confused Rule 21 with Rule 42(b) and should not have
attempted to separate unitary problem).
The distinction, although often seemingly a technicality, could affect Federal Circuit
jurisdictional determinations. For example, if a patent count is severed and the remainder of
the case is appealed, the Federal Circuit no longer has jurisdiction over that "case." Appeal
properly may be taken as of right from a severed claim notwithstanding the pendency of the
remaining claims. Id. at 361.
282. See infra notes 293-99 and accompanying text (discussing issues involved in Atan).
283. 770 F.2d 1035, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
284. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 770 F.2d 1035, 1036, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1088,
1038 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
285. 1d., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1038.
286. Id., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1038.
287. I, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1039.
288. Id., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1039.
289. Id., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1039.
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Circuit twice on appeal with many of the underlying issues fully
briefed by the parties to that court."2"
Admirably, the Federal Circuit decided the jurisdictional issue on
the most narrow grounds available. Had the issue been presented,
however, the holding of the case could have been more general.
Because the patent counts were "severed," the remaining counts
constituted a separate and distinct case over which the Federal Circuit
did not have jurisdiction. 91 When a count that is the basis of the
Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is severed, therefore, the appellate route
of the different counts also should be severed. Although it seems
peculiar, this result is somewhat more palatable considering the
severed count is separately appealable as a matter of right (unlike a
count separated for trial).292
In Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.,293 patent and copyright in-
fringement counts were separated.2" A preliminary injunction
enjoining copyright infringement was entered and appealed.295 The
Federal Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal from the
preliminary injunction notwithstanding the separation of the patent
counts because jurisdiction was based in part on § 1338.295 Atari is
consistent with the foregoing analysis primarily because of the
distinction between "separation" and "severance."297 Although both
cases were properly decided, USM did not expressly recognize the
distinction between "separation" and "severance," emphasizing instead
the "judicial efficiency" in transferring the case.298  Thus, there is
290. Id. at 1037, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1040.
291. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994) (granting Federal Circuitjurisdiction over appeals from
district court when district court's jurisdiction was based on § 1838).
292. See supra note 281 (noting that appeal may be taken as of right from severed claim).
293. 747 F.2d 1422, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
294. Atari, Inc. v.JS &A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1425, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1074, 1075
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
295. Id. at 1424, 1427, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1075, 1077.
296. Id. at 1431, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1080 (holding that effect of separation order on
court's jurisdiction was "nil").
297. See supra notes 279-81 (discussing distinction between "separation" and "severance").
Although Ataripredated the recognition of the distinction between "severance" and"separation,"
the court did note that it would be inaccurate to use the terms interchangeably. Atar, 747 F.2d
at 1426 n.l, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1076 n.l.
The cases are distinguishable also because in Atari there was an effort to manipulate
jurisdiction. Id. at 1425, 233 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1075. In USM, however, there was no such
effort. USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 770 F.2d 1035, 1037, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1038,
1040 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
298. See USM, 770 F.2d at 1037, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1040 (holding that because Seventh
Circuit had seen case twice on appeal, judicial efficiency favored transferring case there).
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some doubt as to whether the Federal Circuit will follow this
distinction in the future.2
In Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper Inc.," the Federal Circuit held
that it had jurisdiction over a case in which a final determination was
rendered by the district court on patent and non-patent counts,."'
even though only the non-patent counts were appealed.02 The
propriety of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction was referenced only in
a footnote and was not discussed, probably because the propriety of
accepting jurisdiction was clear.303
In Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,S"a the plaintiffs patent in-
fringement count was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice, and the
defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on a non-
patent count.30 5  The Federal Circuit held that the dismissal of
Gronholz's patent claim constituted an amendment of his complaint
consisting of a single, non-patent claim for unfair competition.0 '
Applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, the court determined that
the suit did not "arise under" the patent laws for jurisdictional
purposes.0 7
A "bright line" rule, which will work in every case, can be formulat-
ed to reconcile USM, Atari, and Gemveto: the Federal Circuit should
look to the basis for the district court's jurisdiction in the "case"
appealed. 08 Because Gronholz does not follow this rule, it is difficult
to reconcile with USM, Atari, and Gemveto. In Gronholz, the Federal
Circuit deemed the complaint amended instead of looking to the
basis for the district court's jurisdiction in the "case" appealed."t°
299. The future precedential effect of USM is clouded even further by Gronholz v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1987), in which the court
described USMas involving "very special circumstances." Id. at 516,5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
300. 800 F.2d 256, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 876 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
301. GemvetoJewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256, 258 n.2, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
876, 878 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting jurisdiction based on non-patent claims asserted at trial).
302. Id at 257-58,230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 877-78 (discussing order enjoining defendant from
sellingjewehy with similar designs as plaintiff's).
303. Id. at 258 n.2, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 878 n.2. Once the district court rendered a final
judgment on a patent count, appellate jurisdiction could not be controlled by what was
appealed. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is determined by the basis of the district court's
jurisdiction. In this case, the district court based its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1982).
304. 836 F.2d 515, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
305. Gronholz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 836 F.2d 515, 516, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269, 1269
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
306. Id. at 518, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
307. Id., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
308. See supra notes 283-89 and accompanying text (explaining that because patent counts
were severed in USM, it was distinct patent "case").
309. See Gronholz, 836 F.2d at 518-19, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271-72 (granting motion to
transfer appeal for lack of jurisdiction because suit did not "arise under" patent law for
jurisdictional purposes).
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Because the complaint in Gronholz was based in part on § 1338,310
the Federal Circuit should have accepted jurisdiction.
The court in Gronholz was likely concerned with manipulation of its
jurisdiction. On appeal, it was clear that the case was not a patent
case, and perhaps not a case which Congress intended the Federal
Circuit to review.311 This is an ad hoc determination, however,
making the appellate forum in future cases unpredictable. The
Federal Circuit can prevent manipulation of its jurisdiction by
establishing an exception to this rule for frivolous allegations in the
complaint.
The Federal Circuit reviews on appeal non-patent claims when they
are in a "case" in which the district court's jurisdiction was based at
least in part on § 1338.312 An analogous situation is the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction, although the analogy is imperfect.
Pendent jurisdiction exists when state and federal claims313 arise
"from a common nucleus of operative fact"314 and are such that the
parties "would ordinarily be expected to try them" in a single
proceeding.315 The Court in Gibbs opined that the trial court had
the discretion whether or not to hear the pendent state claim.316
According to Gibbs, trial courts, in exercising this discretion, should
consider 'judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."317
r
310. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (noting that Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction of appeal when district court's jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338).
311. Gronhol, 836 F.2d at 516, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269 (stating that dismissal of patent
claim left only misappropriation of trade secrets claim).
312. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994) (stating that Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeal from district court in which jurisdiction was based on § 1338).
313. See 1 MOORE ET AL, supra note 232, 1 0.67, at 700.197 (noting that claims allowed by
Federal Rules are to be heard as supplemental claims). The concept of pendent jurisdiction
applies to counterclaims as well as to original claims. Id. A compulsory counterclaim, or one
that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the main claim, is typically within the
pendentjurisdiction of the court. Id.; see also Hy-Way Heat Sys., Inc. v.Jadair, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
454,455 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (noting that if counterclaim is permissive under Rule 13, independent
diversity jurisdiction must be alleged and met).
314. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
315. I& In Gibbs, the plaintiff sued the Mine Workers Union in federal court alleging that
the union pressured his employer into discharging him. I& at 720. Gibbs alleged both a federal
claim, violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, and a state claim, unlawful conspiracy to interfere with
contract of employment. I& The trial court held in favor of the Union on the federal claim
but entered judgment in Gibbs' favor on the state claim. Id. at 720-21. The Supreme Court
reversed the state claim but expressly held that it was within the trial court's pendentjurisdiction
to enter judgment on the federal claim. Id. at 742.
316. See id. at 726 (holding that pendent jurisdiction is not plaintiffs right, but rather
doctrine of discretion).
317. Id. The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction was later broadened in Hagans v. Lavine, 415
U.S. 528 (1974), to include jurisdiction over a federal claim which was substantially weaker than
the state claim. Id at 543. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), may have broadened this
doctrine further in recognizing that pendent jurisdiction may be present, at least in some
circumstances, even when the presence of a third party is necessary to litigate the pendent claim.
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In cases such as USM, Atari, Gemveto, and Gronhoh, the district court
must hear the non-patent claims because federal subject matter
jurisdiction already exists and therefore those claims are properly in
federal court;318 the trial court does not have the discretion not to
hear the "pendent" claims. The claims are only "pendent" in the
sense that the district court's jurisdiction was based in part on § 1338.
Had there been no § 1338jurisdiction, the district court'sjurisdiction
could have been based on federal question, 19 diversity,320 or some
other provision. Thus, a peculiar situation has arisen in which counts
properly in federal court because of diversity or the presence of a
federal question are, in a sense, "pendent" to patent counts.
The Federal Circuit's task is therefore unlike that of its sister
circuits. Instead of determining whether the trial court's decision to
hear the "pendent" claim was an abuse of discretion, it must decide
in the first instance whether to hear the "pendent" claim.
This situation is problematic. The Federal Circuit is called upon,
in a sense, to exercise its "discretion" in deciding whether to entertain
appeals in cases which no longer contain patent claims. However, a
"discretionary" decision is, by its very nature, unpredictable. A court
will examine the circumstances in the totality and do what it believes
should be done. Such a practice, for appellate jurisdiction, will lead
to a waste of time, judicial resources, and the resources of the parties.
Thus, the above suggested "bright line" rule should be adopted to
determine whether Federal Circuitjurisdiction is present when patent
counts are severed, separated, or withdrawn.
4. Consolidated cases
Cases consolidated in district court present yet anotherjurisdiction-
al issue with no parallel prior to creation of the Federal Circuit.
Because federal cases can never be consolidated with state cases, a
determination of whether both complaints should be considered in
the jurisdictional decision was never made under traditional notions
of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
In In re Innotron Diagnostics,21 the Federal Circuit held that when
separately filed suits are consolidated, the Federal Circuit has
Id. at 18.
318. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994) (stating that district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
patent cases).
319. See id. § 1331 (stating that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
320. See id § 1332 (providing district courts with original jurisdiction when parties have
diversity of citizenship).
321. 800 F.2d 1077, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 178 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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jurisdiction over the entire case." The Federal Circuit's rationale
was that such a case is analogous to a case in which a counterclaim is
filed, and therefore, the Federal Circuit should have jurisdiction.3 23
The rule in the majority of courts is that jurisdiction cannot be
based on a counterclaim. 24 This majority rule was not recognized
by the Federal Circuit, and therefore, the precedential effect of this
decision is questionable.
The Federal Circuit, however, was persuasive in reasoning that "[i] t
would ... be incongruous to hold that consolidation of a separate
suit ... is distinct, in relation to this court's jurisdiction, from the
presence of a counterclaim raising the same allegations of patent
infringement .... ,,31 Thus, for the reasons explained with respect
to permissive counterclaims, the Federal Circuit should have
jurisdiction over consolidated cases in which the pleadings in one of
the cases would properly provide § 1338 jurisdiction. 26
5. Summary ofjurisdictional determinations under the well-pleaded
complaint rule
The Federal Circuit should formulate the "bright line" rules
discussed above.3 27  Although many of these rules do not strictly
follow the traditional well-pleaded complaint rule, in some situations
traditional jurisdictional notions will not suffice, and in others,
deviating from the traditional notions will further the congressional
goals in establishing the Federal Circuit.
322. See In reInnotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1080, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 178, 180 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (exercisingjurisdiction over entire case because district court's jurisdiction was based
"in part" on § 1338(a)).
323. See id (noting that allegation ofpatent infringement filed as non-frivolous counterclaim
is same as separate complaint that is later consolidated with non-patent case).
324. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (stating that Federal Circuitjurisdiction must
be based on claims brought under § 1338).
325. Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d at 1080, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 180.
326. Sesupra note 313 (notingjurisdictional requirements of permissive counterclaims); see
also Dorf& Stanton Communications, Inc. v. Molson Breweries, 56 F.3d 13,13-14,34 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1856, 1857 (2d Cir. 1995) ("This motion to dismiss an appeal from a discovery ruliig
presents an esoteric issue arising within the dual-track regime existing with respect to the Court
ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit and the regional courts of appeals."); Kennedy v. Wright, 851
F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1988) (citingjurisdictional hypotheticals not answered by Christianson).
Also, as explained with respect to amended complaints, objections to consolidation are best
raised in response to the consolidation itself and not to the exercise of the Federal Circuit's
jurisdiction over the entire matter. If consolidation is proper, the Federal Circuit should have
jurisdiction over the entire case if it has jurisdiction over any part of it. See Innotron Diagnostics,
800 F.2d at 1080, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 180 (holding that Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over
entire case).
327. See supra notes 308-21 and accompanying text (arguing that Federal Circuit should look
to basis for district court's jurisdiction in case appealed).
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In summary, when a complaint is amended, the amended complaint
should control the Federal Circuit's. jurisdiction. 2 When patent
counts are severed, the Federal Circuit should not have jurisdiction
over the non-patent "case," 29 but when the non-patent counts are
separated, the Federal Circuit should have jurisdiction over the entire
case, including the non-patent counts.38 0 When a patent count is
dismissed, the Federal Circuit should maintain jurisdiction over the
case unless original inclusion of the patent count is found to be
manipulative or frivolous."8 1
B. The Application of Traditional "Arising Under" Principles by the
Federal Circuit
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over an
appeal from a district court if the jurisdiction of the district court was
based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.332 Under § 1338,
district courts havejurisdiction over "any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents."
333
Because the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is invoked where the
action is based "in part" on 28 U.S.C. § 1338,3s issues arise when
the stated jurisdictional basis for an action is something other than
§ 1338, but the well-pleaded complaint, as discussed above, pleads any
action requiring in part resolution of a matter "arising under an Act
of Congress relating to patents."8 5 This issue can be analyzed in
two parts. First, regardless of the stated basis for jurisdiction, does
part of the action involve statutory issues "relating to patents"?
.Second, if a statute does "relate to patents," does the action in the
well-pleaded complaint "arise under" that statute?
1. The broad definition of "any Act of Congress relating to patents"
The Federal Circuit has generally interpreted the language in
§ 1338(a)-"any Act of Congress relating to patents"-expansively.8 8 '
328. See supra notes 272-78 and accompanying text (stating that amended complaint controls
for jurisdictional purposes).
329. See supra notes 283-92 and accompanying text (noting result in USM in which patent
and antitrust claims were severed).
330. See supra notes 293-99 and accompanying text (discussing Atari, in which patent and
copyright infringement claims were separated).
331. Seesupra notes 304-07 and accompanying text (noting result in Grunhoz, in which patent
infringement count voluntarily was dismissed).
332. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994); see also supra note 312 and accompanying text (stating
Federal Circuit's basis for jurisdiction over appeal).
333. Id § 1338(a).
334. See id. § 1295 (delineating Federal Circuit jurisdiction).
335. Id § 1338(a).
336. Id
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Whether such a liberal reading is warranted, especially where the
underlying proceedings involve administrative or statutory interpreta-
tion issues not peculiar to patent law, is debatable. Nonetheless, given
that this issue typically arises where the issue is not one of whether
the district court properly has subject matter jurisdiction, but rather
which basis of federal court subject matter jurisdiction is applicable,
erring on the side of Federal Circuit jurisdiction is consistent with
Congress' purpose of creating a co-equal circuit court with specialized
jurisdiction. 7
In Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks" and Jaskiewicz
v. Mossinghoff,39 the Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, respective-
ly, held that the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over an appeal from
the decision of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks to
suspend or exclude someone from practicing before the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 31 and 32.M°
Section 32 of Tite 35 provides that "[t]he United States District
Court for the District of Columbia... may review the action of the
Commissioner."41 Because § 32 arises under an Act of Congress
relating to patents, the provision grants the district court jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338.' Therefore, it is not necessary to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff's right to relief required a resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.' " The only question requiring
resolution was whether §§ 31 and 32 were within the definition of
"any Act of Congress relating to patents."3 4
337. See supra notes 3-5 (noting that Congress created Federal Circuit to unify application
of patent laws).
338. 807 F.2d 934, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 918 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
339. 802 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
340. SeeWyden v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934,936-37,231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 918, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that decision under 35 U.S.C. § 32 arises under Act
of Congress relating to patents, and therefore that district court's jurisdiction was proper under
28 U.S.C. § 1338 and appellate review exclusively granted to Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C.§ 1295(a));Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d 532, 536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1994), the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks may prescribe
regulations governing the recognition and conduct of persons practicing before the PTO. Md
The Commissioner may require such persons to show that they are qualified to practice before
the Patent Office (the Commissioner has implemented this by requiring prospective patent
agents or patent attorneys to take an examination) and to show that they are of good moral
character. Id Under 35 U.S.C. § 32, the Commissioner may discipline persons registered to
practice before the PTO. Id.
341. 35 U.S.C. § 32.
342. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text (discussing holdings in 1iden and
Jaskiewi-c).
343. Federal courts have jurisdiction if either: (1) federal law creates the cause of action; or
(2) plaintiff's right to relief necessarily requires resolution of a substantial issue of federal law.
See supra notes 319-20 and accompanying text (noting when federal courts attain jurisdiction).
344. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). If §§ 31 and 32 meet the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), the
Federal Circuit has appellate jurisdiction; if they do not satisfy this definition, then the D.C.
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In Jaskiewicz, petitioner was suspended from practice before the
PTO pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 32 for misconduct.'4 Jaskiewicz
appealed this decision by the Deputy Commissioner for Patents and
Trademarks to the D.C. District Court,'"6 which affirmed the
Commissioner's decision by summary judgments47 and then ap-
pealed that decision to the D.C. Circuit.-' The Commissioner
moved to have the appeal transferred to the Federal Circuit pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1631,14 arguing that the suit was a "civil action
arising under [an] Act of Congress relating to patents" pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1338(a).5 °
The D.C. Circuit noted that "[t]he critical question.., is whether
the federal legislation establishing the PTO, and setting forth its
authority to discipline those who practice before the agency, is an 'Act
of Congress relating to patents.'""'1 The court went on to note:
[T]he Federal Circuit has given a broad construction to the
'relating to patents' language in § 1338, at least in part because one
of the primary objectives of [the Circuit's] enabling legislation is to
bring about uniformity in the area of patent law .... [The Federal
Circuit], thus, has a mandate to achieve uniformity in patent
matters.
352
Significant to the court was the objective of achieving uniformity in
patent law.353  It believed the Federal Circuit must have "exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals relating to who may practice before the
Patent and Trademark Office."354 Thus, it held "[t]he right to
practice patent law arises under 35 U.S.C. § 31 (1982). Although...
this right is 'not created by the patent laws in the same sense as the
Circuit has appellate jurisdiction.
345. SeeJaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d 532, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating thatJaskiewicz
was suspended because of misconduct in representation of parties before PTO). Section 32
provides:
The Commissioner may ... suspend or exclude ... from further practice before the
Patent and Trademark Office, any person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent
or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct .... The United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, under such conditions and upon such proceedings as it
by its rules determines, may review the action of the Commissioner upon the petition
of the person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded.
35 U.S.C. § 32.
346. Jaskiezwi, 802 F.2d at 533.
347. Id.
348. 1d.
349. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994) (allowing for transfer of appeal to another court).
350. Jaskiewicz, 802 F.2d at 535 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982)).
351. Id.
352. Id (quoting Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574, 223
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bulk of § 1338(a) cases,' it surely may 'be defeated or sustained by the
construction given the patent laws.' 3 55
In Wyden, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks did not
award Stephen Wyden a passing grade on the examination for
registration to practice before the PTO as a patent agent."5 Wyden
petitioned in the district court for the District of Columbia to
overturn this action by the PTO."5 The district court granted
summary judgment denying Wyden's petition, and Wyden appealed
to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed. 58 The Federal Circuit's
jurisdictional decision was made by the court in banc court and
provoked a dissent by the Chief Judge. 59
The Federal Circuit, holding that it had jurisdiction over the
challenge to the Commissioner's failure to register an attorney to
practice before the PTO, noted that "[t]he review of Wyden's
suspension under § 32, by the District Court for the District of
Columbia, took place pursuant to the last sentence of that sec-
tion."" The last sentence to which the court was referring pro-
vides: "The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
... may review the action of the Commissioner upon the petition of
the person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded." 61
355. I. (quoting Dubost v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1565,
227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). The court's reasoning is unnecessary and
incorrect. Because § 32 expressly provides for review of the action of the Commissioner in
district court, the action "arises under" that section. It is therefore not necessary to determine
whether a construction of the patent laws would sustain or defeat the action. See supra note 345
(stating language of 35 U.S.C. § 32).
Apparently, the reasoning of the court was that a patent attorney could be disciplined under
§ 32 for failing to comply with a separate section of the patent laws, and that review of such a
disciplinary action would require a construction of the patent laws. Jaskieadd, 802 F.2d at 536-37.
The result is an overbroad interpretation of "arising under" jurisdiction because, under this
rationale, any time an attorney is faced with an action involving title 35, such as malpractice in
connection with a patent infringement suit, it would be within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction
and, more significantly, within general federal question jurisdiction (thus removing such actions
from state courts).
It is noted, however, that giving the Federal Circuit jurisdiction over such matters would have
some benefits because of the court's expertise in patent matters. See idt at 536 (stating that any
other result would defeat goal of uniformity in application of patent laws). The Federal Circuit
routinely reviews actions concerned with the sections of title 35 relevant to the disciplinary
proceedings, and therefore, it is in a better position to resolve efficiently and correctly such
questions than are regional circuits. For example, as the court inJaskwid notedJaskiewicz was
being disciplined for violating 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1982), a section of the statute concerned with
the filing of patent applications. Jaskwic 802 F.2d at 536.
356. Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 807 F.2d 934, 935, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 918, 919 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
357. IM. at 935, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 919.
.358. Id., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 919.
359. I, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 919.
360. I. at 936, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 920.
361. 35 U.S.C. § 32 (1994).
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The court also noted that "at least one of Wyden's major claims arises
under § 32 of Title 35 of the United States Code ... which is the
Patent Act of 1952, as amended, the heading of that entire tide being
'PATENTS." 362
Despite the D.C. and Federal Circuits' efforts to define §§ 31 and
32 as falling within the patent laws, the fact remained that this "case
... involves no patent, and deals only with administrative law."' 3
The majority in Wyden, and the panel in Jaskiewicz, read the phrase
"relating to patents" broadly in finding jurisdiction in the Federal
Circuit over cases relating more to the administration of the Patent
Office than to patent law." The majority of the court was not
convinced by the dissent's argument that there is no "indication, in
the legislative history or otherwise, that Congress had the slightest
intent to place oversight of the PTO administration exclusively in" the
Federal Circuit.30
After Wyden it was clear that the Federal Circuit would take an
expansive view of what falls within the definition of "any Act of
Congress relating to patents."36 Limited to the facts, Wyden simply
holds that the PTO's disciplining of an attorney is subject to the
Federal Circuit's review. 67 In looking at the court's in banc ratio-
nale, however, it appears that the court considered all of Title 35 of
the United States Code to be Acts of Congress relating to patents."3
The broad interpretation of the "relating to patents" language in
§ 1338 is supported by other Federal Circuit decisions. The Federal
Circuit has accepted jurisdiction over cases brought under § 256 in a
suit for correction of inventorship369 and under § 111 in a manda-
362. Wden, 807 F.2d at 935, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 919-20.
363. Id. at 938, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 923 (Markey, CJ., dissenting) (emphasis added).
364. See id. at 935, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 920 (finding Federal Circuit jurisdiction despite
Judge Markey's plea that only administrative law was at issue);Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d
532, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review
district court decision refusing to overturn disciplinary action taken against attorney by Patent
and Trademark Office).
365. Wden, 807 F.2d at 938, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 922 (Markey, CJ., dissenting).
366. Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr. v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573, 1577, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1188,
1193 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("We conclude that 42 U.S.C. § 5908 is 'an Act of Congress relating to
patents'...."). Section 5908 relates to vesting the United States with title of patents conceived
during the course of a contract with the Department of Energy. 42 U.S.C. § 5908 (1994). See
also Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843,846, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
see supra notes 356-65 and accompanying text (indicating that action challenging suspension or
disbarment from practice before PTO is within scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction).
367. Wyden, 807 F.2d at 936, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 480-81.
368. Id. at 935, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 919-20 ("[A]t least one of Wyden's major claims arises
under section 32 of Title 35 of the United States Code (USC) which is the Patent Act of 1952,
as amended, the heading of that entire title being 'PATENTS'.").
369. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994); MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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mus action to compel the Commissioner to accord an application a
filing date. 7' In each of these cases, the Federal Circuit assumed,
without extensive discussion in accepting jurisdiction, that these were
Acts of Congress relating to patents.371 The Federal Circuit also
intimated, in a case in which it did not find jurisdiction, that
§ 294,72 which provides that parties can voluntarily contract for
mandatory arbitration, relates to patents. s~
The broad interpretation of the definition of an Act of Congress
relating to patents is not confined to Title 35. In Alco Standard Corp.
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 74 the Federal Circuit construed an act
which provides "any owner of a patent whose patent rights may have
been ... in any way copied, used, infringed, or employed by" the
Tennessee Valley Authority with "the exclusive remedy [of] a cause of
action against [TVA in] the appropriate district court of the United
States, for the recovery of reasonable compensation for such
infringement," as being an Act of Congress relating to patents.375
According to the majority, the statute requires an infringement
determination and thus relates to patents. 6  The fact that § 831r
provides the "exclusive remedy" does not make the suit any less of a
patent suit according to the majority.377 "[Section] 831r specifies
the conditions that govern the patentee's suit for infringement, while
§ 1338(a) gives the district courts jurisdiction to hear that suit."378
The majority's statement that § 1338(a) gives the district court
jurisdiction is difficult to understand in view of the express provision
for district court jurisdiction in § 831r.179 Judge Nies' dissent on the
jurisdictional point presents a powerful argument.' She explains
that a "16 U.S.C. § 831r claim against TVA is more comparable to a
370. 35 U.S.C. § 111; Dubostv. United States Patent& Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561,227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
371. See MCV, 870 F.2d at 1570 (finding Federal Circuitjurisdiction); Dubos4 777 F.2d at 1565
(same).
372. 35 U.S.C. § 294.
373. See Ballard Medical Prods. v. Wright, 823 F.2d 527,3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (holding that Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction over federal district court's decision
confirming arbitration award because federal district court's jurisdiction was based solely on
diversity).
374. 808 F.2d 1490, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. disncsed 483 U.S. 1052
(1987).
375. Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1494, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir.) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 831(r) (1982)), cert. dfsnissed, 483 U.S. 1052
(1987).
376. 1I, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
377. 1I, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
378. I., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
379. Id. at 1494-95, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339-40.
380. Id. at 1504, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (Nies, J., concurring).
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claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1982) for reasonable compensation for
use of a patented invention by the government, which does not arise
under a patent statute .... than to a claim for patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271. "s81 It is hard, however, to argue with the
majority's reasoning that "[ilt would be anomalous if appeals in
patent infringement suits against TVA were heard by the regional
circuit, when all other appeals in patent infringement suits come to
this court."82 This anomaly does not exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1498
because those appeals go to the Federal Circuit under a separate
statutory provision.38
2. The Federal Circuit's application of Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co. in interpreting "arising under"
In Dubost v. United States Patent & Trademark Office,s 4 a patent
application was filed meeting all of the statutory requirements for
obtaining a filing date, except that a check required for the payment
of the filing fee was unsigned."ts The Commissioner for Patents and
Trademarks refused to give the application a filing date for the day
it was submitted to the PTO." 6 Rather, the application received a
filing date for the day the check was received. 7
Dubost petitioned the District Court for the District of Columbia
for a writ of mandamus compelling the Commissioner to accord
Dubost the earlier filing date.' The district court found that it had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361.389 The district court then
upheld the Commissioner's actions, explaining that 35 U.S.C. § 111
contains no provision for a waiver of the patent application fee and
381. Id., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347 (Nies,J., concurring) (citing Motorola, Inc. v. United
States, 729 F.2d 765, 768, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 297, 299 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
382. Id. at 1494, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339; see also Cedars-Sinai v. Watkins, 11 F.3d 1573,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
383. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994) (providing jurisdiction in United States Court of Federal
Claims for patent infringement suits against United States).
384. 777 F.2d 1561, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
385. Dubost v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1562, 227 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 977, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1982) provides that a patent application
must, inter alia, "be accompanied by the fee required by law." Id.
386. Dubost, 777 F.2d at 1562, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 977.
387. Id. at 1562-63, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 977. The filing date was significant to this
applicant because the application was filed on the last day for which the applicant could obtain
the benefit of a foreign priority date.
388. Id. at 1563, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978.
389. Id., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978. Section 1361 provides that "district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee
of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1994).
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that the check submitted with the original application could not
satisfy the fee requirement, as it was unsigned." °
On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that the determination of
whether it had jurisdiction was based on how (and whether) the
district court had jurisdiction.39' The Federal Circuit then held that
the district court had jurisdiction because, inter alia, Dubost asserted
before the district court some right or privilege that would be
defeated by one or sustained by an opposite construction of the
patent laws.392
Jurisdiction in both the cause of action and the remedy in Dubost
were provided by § 1361, the mandamus statute, not by the patent
laws. 93 The dispute arises under the patent laws only because
resolution of the dispute requires a construction of the patent
laws. 3
Thus, the jurisdictional analysis employed by the Federal Circuit is
analogous to that set forth in Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust
Co.3 95 Dubost and Smith differ, however, in that Smith involved a state
versus federal jurisdictional dispute, whereas in Dubost the dispute was
regional circuit versus Federal Circuit. 96 Irrespective of the out-
come of the jurisdictional dispute in Dubost, the district court properly
had jurisdiction. 97
The Federal Circuit did not acknowledge the complexities of the
jurisdictional analysis which it was adopting sub silentio 98 Nor did
it acknowledge that the rationale of Smith has an extensive subsequent
history, finds little later support, has been criticized by commentators,
390. Dubost, 777 F.2d at 1563, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978.
391. Id. at 1564, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978-79. See supra note 86 (explaining procedure for
determining jurisdiction when appeal is taken from district court).
392. Dubost, 777 F.2d at 1564, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 979. This holding provides the Federal
Circuit with jurisdiction because it has jurisdiction if the district court's jurisdiction is based "in
part" on § 1338. 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
393. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994), the section of the patent laws at issue, is not jurisdictional.
394. This case is distinguishable from Wyden v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarks, 807
F.2d 934, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 918 (Fed. Cir. 1986), andjaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 802 F.2d 532
(D.C. Cir. 1986), which required construction of the patent laws to resolve the dispute. In those
cases, 35 U.S.C. § 32 created the cause of action. The issue concerned whether those sections
were "Acts of Congress relating to patents." See supra note 368 and accompanying text
(delineating scope of Federal Circuit jurisdiction under title 35 of U.S. Code). Section 111, on
the other hand, does not create a cause of action. Thejurisdictional analysis in Dubost assumes,
without discussion, that § 111 is an "Act of Congress relating to patents."
395. 255 U.S. 180 (1921); see supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text (explaining that in
Smith, state law provided cause of action and remedy).
396. See supra notes 173-86 and accompanying text (noting differences between state versus
federal jurisdictional dispute and regional circuit versus Federal Circuit jurisdictional dispute).
397. Dubost; 777 F.2d at 1565, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 978-79.
398. The complexities were noted by the dissent, which concurred in the result of the
majority on jurisdiction, but the dissent opined that "their analysis oversimplifies the issue." Id
at 1568, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 982 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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and may have been overruled or at least modified by subsequent cases
such as Merrell Dow. 99
Merrell Dow4 -- which was decided subsequent to Dubost-states
that when determining whether a case "arises under" federal law when
no federal remedy is provided, the focus should be on the nature of
the federal interest at stake."°1 In determining whether the nature
of the patent law interest at stake is significant or important, the
nature of the countervailing interest must be considered."2 Region-
al circuits have only a minimal interest in maintaining jurisdiction
over cases in which the construction of the patent laws is at issue."'
When a case is properly in the federal judicial system, there is a
heightened interest in the Federal Circuit having jurisdiction over the
appeal. 4  Thus, under either the Merrell Dow or Smith analyses, the
Federal Circuit properly has jurisdiction over cases such as Dubost.
Ballard Medical Products v. Wright. 5 was jurisdictionally similar to
the Dubost case, but in Ballard, the Federal Circuit refused
jurisdiction.0 5 Ballard filed a complaint alleging that Wright had
breached a licensing agreement.40 7 Before answering the complaint,
Wright invoked an arbitration clause in the agreement.4"u The
district court stayed the action pending arbitration.4'u The arbitra-
tion determined that there was no breach of the license agree-
ment.410 Wright moved in the district court to confirm the arbitra-
tion.1 Ballard moved to vacate the arbitration on several grounds
under 9 U.S.C. § 10 and argued that the arbitration improperly
399. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text (explaining nature of "federal interest at
stake" analysis). The court quoted Justice Holmes' statement in American Well Works Co. v.
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the
cause of action." Id. at 260. It dismissed this statement, however, because "it has been rejected
as an exclusionary principle." Dubost, 777 F.2d at 1565, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 979 (quoting
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983)).
400. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
401. Id.
402. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (discussing efficacy of federal question
jurisdiction under Merrell Dow).
403. Seesupra note 186-89 and accompanying text (discussing importance of federal interest
test to improved uniformity over regional circuit decisions).
404. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (arguing that there is heightened interest
for Federal Circuit jurisdiction under Merrell Dow analysis whenever patent law is in question).
405. 823 F.2d 527, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
406. Ballard Medical Prod. v. Wright, 823 F.2d 527, 532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1339-40
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
407. Id. at 529, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
408. Id, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
409. Id, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
410. Id, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
411. Id, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
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refused to invalidate the patents at issue for failure to comply with 35
U.S.C. § 112.412
The district court confirmed the arbitration in all respects and
appeal was taken to the Federal Circuit.41 The Federal Circuit held
that it did not have jurisdiction because the district court'sjurisdiction
was based on diversity and not, in whole or in part, on § 1338.414
Ballard argued that 35 U.S.C. § 294, which provides that "[a]
contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may contain
a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent
validity or infringement arising under the contract,"415 vested the
Federal Circuit with appellate jurisdiction.416 The Federal Circuit
rejected this argument, stating that this is not a "dispute relating to
patent validity and infringement arising under the contract" as
required by § 294.417 The court then explained that "[b]eyond the
inability of [§] 294 to form the basis for a cause of action, or as the
basis for district court jurisdiction, the record here establishes that
Ballard's cause of action did not arise out of such a dispute."418
The Federal Circuit is technically incorrect, however, in holding
that "[§ ] 294 simply played no role in this case." 419 A patent license
is "[a] contract involving a patent."2 0 Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 294
expressly permits the contract at issue here to contain an arbitration
clause.42'
Rejecting Federal Circuit jurisdiction in Ballard could be read as
inconsistent with the Smith-type analysis used by the court in
Dubost.4 22 The Federal Circuit states and then rejects the first of the
methods for obtaining federal jurisdiction.41 The Federal Circuit
412. Id. at 529-30, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
413. Id. at 530, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
414. Id. at 530-31, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
415. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1994).
416. Ballard Medical Prod., 823 F.2d at 530, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
417. Id. at 531, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
418. Id., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
419. See id., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339.
420. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1994); see also HARRY R. MAYERS & BRIGN BRUNSVOLD, DRAFTING
PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 1-5 (2d ed. 1984) (defining patent license agreement).
421. See 35 U.S.C. § 294 ("A contract involving a patent or any right under a patent may
contain a provision requiring arbitration of any dispute relating to patent validity or
infringement arising under the contract.").
422. See Dubost v. United States Patent & Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1564, 227
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977, 978-79 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (findingjurisdiction in Federal Circuit because
construction of patent laws required it); see also supra notes 393-94 and accompanying text
(explaining mandamus statute and patent law construction bestows Federal Circuitjurisdiction).
423. See supra text accompanying note 27 (explaining that to have typical federal question
"arising under" jurisdiction either (1) federal law must create cause of action; or (2) plaintiff's
right to relief necessarily must depend on the resolution of substantial question of federal law).
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then does not address the second of the tests.424 The parties are
properly in federal court on diversity grounds.4  The right to relief
and cause of action are provided by state contract law, but at least
Ballard argued that a substantial issue of patent law necessarily
requires resolution as a basis for the relief requested-the patent law
issue being the validity and application of the arbitration clause.426
The court disagreed, however, perhaps seeing an attempt to create a
jurisdictional issue where none in fact existed. Moreover, perhaps the
court recognized that, unlike Dubost, Ballard's claim essentially was
based on state law.
In MCV, Inc. v. King-Seeey Thermos Co.,427 MCV sued under 35
U.S.C. § 256428 for a correction of the named inventor of a pat-
ent.' The Federal Circuit, in addressing its jurisdiction, held that
§ 256 creates an express cause of action.30
In the alternative, the Federal Circuit held that even if § 256 did
not create an express cause of action, it had jurisdiction because the
"relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal patent law."41  The Federal Circuit reasoned that to correct
inventorship under § 256, a court must first determine whether one
is an "inventor" and then must determine whether the "error of
424. See supra notes 420-21 and accompanying text (explaining federal question doctrine
under 35 U.S.C. § 294).
425. Ballard Medical Prod. v. Wright, 823 F.2d 527, 530, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
426. Id at 530-31, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338-39.
427. 870 F.2d 1568, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
428. 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994) provides in pertinent part: "The court before which [an error
in naming inventors] is called in question may order correction of the patent.... " Id
429. MGV, Inc. v. King-Seeley Thermos Co., 870 F.2d 1568, 1569, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1287,
1288 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
430. Id at 1570, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289. This decision, while supported by non-
binding precedent, is questionable. SeeIowa State Univ. Research Found. v. Sperry Rand Corp.,
444 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding federal jurisdiction for inventorship corrections under 35
U.S.C. § 256 is proper if notice and opportunity for all parties to be heard is provided); Dee v.
Aukerman, 625 F. Supp. 1427 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (holding federal district court is not precluded
under 35 U.S.C. § 256 from hearing case for correction of named inventor as long as plaintiff
alleges that omission or error was inadvertent rather than caused by named inventor's deceptive
intent). In providing that a "court before which [an error of omitting inventors] is called in
question may order correction of the patent," the statute seems more appropriately read to
permit a court to correct inventorship when the patent is otherwise before it.
For example, in a suit for infringement, if a defense of invalidity for failure to comply with
35 U.S.C. § 111 (which states that "application for patent shall be made by the inventor") is
raised, § 256 permits a court to correct the inventorship instead of being forced to hold the
patent invalid on that basis. Section 256 does not seem appropriately read to create a cause of
action in district court for correction of inventorship. See 35 U.S.C. § 256 (vesting power to
correct patent inventorship with Commissioner of Patent and Trademark Office but not
specifying which court may order correction).
431. MGV, 870 F.2d at 1570, 10 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1290 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 806 (1988)).
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omitting inventors" was made "without any deceptive intention. " "
Both questions require resolution of a substantial patent law ques-
433tion.
To the extent the alternative disposition of MCVwould have been
predicated on diversity grounds, MCVparallels the Smith and Merrell
Dow analysis insofar as the dispute was federal versus state.4' There
is a long history of denying federal jurisdiction in state law cases
raising a patent issue.4 5  These cases could be distinguished based
on a heightened federal interest in patent law as shown by the
creation of the Federal Circuit and other recent patent law legisla-
tion.436 The MCV opinion drew no such distinction. It is apparent,
however, that the court focused on the second prong of the Smith
analysis, which inquires whether the case necessarily required a
substantial question of patent law be resolved to reach the decision.
On the other hand, other Federal Circuit cases, such as Beghin-Say
International, Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen 137 and Consolidated World
Housewares, Inc. v. Finkle,'s can be read consistently with the alterna-
tive disposition of MCV only by concluding that no substantial
question of patent law need be decided in reaching a decision.3 9
In Beghin-Say, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint' 0 requesting
that "the district court declare that the 'assignment' of... two U.S.
applications is 'valid' under 35 U.S.C. § 261, and that it vests in
Beghin-Say all right[s] to the invention(s) set forth in those applica-
tions.""' Section 261 provides that "[a]pplications for patent,
patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by any
instrument in writing."'
432. Id at 1570-71, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290; see 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1994) ("The court
before which such matter is called in question may order correction of the patent on notice and
hearing of all parties concerned and the Commissioner shall issue a certificate accordingly.").
433. MCV, 870 F.2d at 1570-71, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
434. See id., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290 (discussing jurisdictional question in terms of
federal law versus state law).
435. See supra note 41 (outlining decisions of other courts that refused to find federal
jurisdiction over local rules and customs).
436. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (noting heightened federal interest in
patent law and intellectual property arena).
437. 733 F.2d 1568, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
438. 831 F.2d 261, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
439. See supra text accompanying notes 434-36 (arguing that Federal Circuit improperly
deviated from traditionaljurisprudence in resolving federal versus state jurisdictional question).
440. The amended complaint was controlling for jurisdictional purposes. Beghin-Say Int'l,
Inc. v. Ole-Bendt Rasmussen, 733 F.2d 1568, 1570, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1121, 1122 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
441. Id. at 1570, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1122.
442. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).
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The Federal Circuit held that this was a state law contract action
and, therefore, the district court was without jurisdiction."" "No
question under the patent laws ... is present in or arises out of the
allegations in the complaint," the court concluded.4'
Following the Smith"' analysis, even though the patent laws did
not give rise to the cause of action, there is still a question of federal
law which must necessarily be resolved to sustain the plaintiffs
claim-that question being the validity of the assignment under
§ 261.4" Two distinctions can be drawn from MCV First, the issue
of whether there was an assignment in writing under § 261 may not
have truly been in dispute. A second distinction between MCVand
Beghin-Say resides in the nature or significance of the federal interest
at stake." 7  To draw this distinction, the question of invention or
inventorship of a patent in MCV must be deemed to be a more
important or significant federal interest than that of assignment.
44
Because of the unpredictability this second distinction would impart
to the determination of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, it should be
avoided in the state versus federal context."9
Finkle, like Beghin-Say, involved an action that was contractual in
nature.45 Finkle, however, is more difficult to reconcile with the
MCV In Finkle, a question of inventorship required resolution.
41
The Federal Circuit held that the patent statute "could not possibly
create 'any cause of action"' and that, therefore, there was no federal
jurisdiction.452 As in Beghin-Say, the court does not discuss whether
a substantial issue of patent law requires resolution.453 It appears
the court in Finkle considered the appeal an attempt to create
443. Beghin-Say, 733 F.2d at 1571, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1123-24.
444. Id at 1570-71, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1123.
445. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); see supra text accompanying
notes 39-40 (explaining rationale for Smith analysis in assessing state versus federaljurisdictional
question).
446. See supra notes 440-44 and accompanying text (noting that Beghin-Say involved "[n]o
question under the patent laws" because it was merely state contract action).
447. See supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text (noting that Federal Circuit in MCV
found that for it to have jurisdiction to correct inventorship under § 256, resolution of
substantial patent law question was required).
448. This is supported by the Beghin-Say opinion in which the court said: "The fact is that
the outcome of the present contract action ... is a matter of monumental disinterest to the
federal government." Beghin-Say, 733 F.2d at 1572, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1124.
449. See infra notes 476-77 and accompanying text (noting amenability of substantial federal
question test).
450. Consolidated World Housewares, Inc. v. Finkle, 831 F.2d 261,262,4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1565, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
451. Id. at 263, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1567.
452. Id at 265, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568-69.
453. The patent law issue in Ftnk/ewas the inventorship requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 111, the
same issue in MCV, making this case even more difficult to read consistently with MACV
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jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit by creating a patent issue where
there otherwise was none.' The court's statement, however,
"[tihat a contract action may involve a determination of the true
inventor does not convert that action into one 'arising under' the
patent laws" seems plainly inconsistent with MGVand its Smith-Merrell
Dow analyses of § 133 8 .11
Some clarity was added to this area with the court's decision in
AT&T v. Integrated Network Corp.456 In AT&T, the plaintiff AT&T
sued four former employees for breach of their employment contracts
requiring them to assign to the corporation inventions conceived
during their employment.1 The suit was brought in state court.
The defendants removed on the grounds that the case arose under
the patent laws." 8  On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's removal decision, citing, inter alia, Beghin-Say and
Finkle, and noting, "Because a court will look to federal law.., does
not confer federal jurisdiction."459 MCV was distinguished on the
grounds that § 256 "'explicitly authorizes federal judicial resolution of
co-inventorship contests over issued patents,' and involved a substan-
tial question of patent law amenable to no non-patent construc-
tion."46
Most recently, however, the Federal Circuit's decision in Additive
Controls & Measurement Systems, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc.461 again clouded
the jurisdictional picture. In Additive Controls, the plaintiff Adcon
brought an action against Flowdata in state court for damages and an
injunction against Flowdata's efforts to allegedly undermine Adcon's
business. Flowdata had sent letters to Adcon's customers warning of
Adcon's patent infringement.462
Flowdata removed the case and counterclaimed for patent
infringement.4 On appeal, Adcon challenged the propriety of the
removal.4' The Federal Circuit found that Adcon's state court
454. "The contractual contretemps which CH created for itself could not possibly create a
'cause of action' under § 1338 for CH." Id. at 265, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
455. Id., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
456. 972 F.2d 1321, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1918 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
457. AT&T v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1322, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1918,
1918-19 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
458. Id, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1919.
459. Id at 1325, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1920-21.
460. Id., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1921.
461. 986 F.2d 476, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
462. Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1799 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
463. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
464. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
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complaint made out a claim for business disparagement.46 Al-
though business disparagement is a state law claim, the Federal
Circuit found that under the circumstances, Adcon would have to
prove Flowdata's patent was not infringed to prevail on its state
claim. 4' Thus, the court concluded that Adcon's right to relief
necessarily required a substantial question of patent law and removal
was therefore proper.467
The court in Additive Controls distinguished American Well Works Co.
v. Layne & Bowler Co.41 on the grounds that the state law at issue in
American Well Works required different proof than the Texas statute
relied on by Adcon.469  The court also stated that "since American
Well Works, the Supreme Court has sharpened its focus of guidance for
ascertaining federal jurisdiction" and cited Smith v. Kansas City for the
proposition that "the Supreme Court has uniformly upheld federal
jurisdiction over cases in which plaintiff's right to relief under state
law required resolution of a substantial question of federal law."470
The argument in Additive Control distinguishing American Well Works
is noteworthy for several reasons. First, in distinguishing the elements
of the two state court causes of action, the court failed to recognize
the state versus federal distinction and the important state interests in
deciding state law claims.471 Nothing in the Federal Courts Im-
provement Act indicates an intent to expand federal jurisdiction
through a broader reading of § 1338. Second, the court's statement
that the Supreme Court has "sharpened its focus" seems plainly
wrong.472 The Supreme Court has certainly expanded its view of
federal question jurisdiction, over Justice Holmes' dissent, but given
the varying breadth with which the two-part "arising under" test has
been interpreted, the Court's pronouncements on the scope of
federal jurisdiction hardly seem "focused. '47  Finally, the court
chose to follow the most expansive of all readings of federal question
jurisdiction, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., without acknowledg-
465. Id. at 478, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799 ("Although not expressly labelling its cause of
action, Adcon's complaint alleges that Flowdata committed business disparagement.").
466. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800.
467. Id, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801.
468. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
469. Additive Controls, 986 F.2d at 478-79, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800. The court also
distinguished the long line of Federal Circuit cases declining to find § 1338 jurisdiction in state
court claims as not involving a cause of action in which plaintiff's right to relief depended upon
resolution of a substantial question of patent law. Id. at 479, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801.
470. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800.
471. See id. at 477, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799 (discussingjurisdictional basis for appeal).
472. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
473. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1799.
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ing the more recent decisions tending to retreat from the Court's
broad language in Smith.4 4 On the basis of Additive Controls and
MCV, it seems the Federal Circuit intends to interpret its jurisdiction
expansively, notjust in the federal versus federal context, but also in
the state versus federal context.47 5
Deciding whether there is federal jurisdiction over cases based on
an evaluation of the nature of the federal interest at stake is disadvan-
tageous in that it is subjective and therefore less predictable.476 As
the dissent in Merrell Dow explained, "[A] test based upon an ad hoc
evaluation of the importance of the federal issue is infinitely mallea-
ble: at what point does a federal interest become strong enough to
create jurisdiction?"477
In applying a "nature of the patent law interest at stake" determina-
tion to Federal Circuit jurisdictional determinations, however, the
unpredictability problem would be minimal. In the federal versus
federal context, because of the dearth of regional circuit interest in
maintainingjurisdiction over patent cases,jurisdiction would normally
reside in the Federal Circuit if the patent law issue was anything more
than minimal. In the state versus federal context, the existing analysis
would remain intact. Thus, weighing the patent law interest at issue
in light of whether the competing interest is either federal or state in
nature should actually increase the predictability of Federal Circuit
jurisdictional determinations.
CONCLUSION
The traditional jurisdictional concepts of "arising under" jurisdic-
tion and the well-pleaded complaint rule should apply to the Federal
Circuit. These traditional jurisdictional notions should be modified,
however, when necessary to fit the unique circumstances of the
Federal Circuit
474. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (acknowledging expansive interpretation of
Federal Circuit jurisdiction in Smith).
475. See supra text accompanying notes 430 and 467 (illustrating expansive interpretation of
Federal Circuitjurisdiction); see also Interspiro USA, Inc. v. Figgie Int'l Inc., 18 F.3d 927, 933,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1070, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (ruling that district court has jurisdiction under
patent laws to award attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 pursuant to settlement agreement).
But see AT&T v. Integrated Network Corp., 972 F.2d 1321, 1324, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1918,
1921 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating that "[b]ecause a court will look to federal law, however, does not
confer federal jurisdiction").
476. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting difficulty and controversy behind
determining what constitutes substantial question of federal law).
477. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 864, 821-23 n.1 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The jurisdictional division in the Federal Circuit is unique in that
federal versus federal jurisdictional determinations must be made in
addition to the classic state versus federal determinations. The policy
concerns in federal versus federal jurisdictional determinations are
different from those in state versus federal jurisdictional determina-
tions. The different policy concerns favor modifying the well-pleaded
complaint rule in federal versus federal jurisdictional determinations.
Furthermore, "arising under" jurisdiction should be interpreted more
broadly in the context of Federal Circuit versus regional circuit
jurisdictional determinations.
Congress' intention in creating the Federal Circuit was to establish
a non-specialized circuit court, co-equal to the regional circuit courts,
whose jurisdiction is defined by subject matter. The Federal Circuit's
goal was to unify patent law. These Congressional aims can best be
fostered by drawing jurisdictional bright-lines which ensure that the
Federal Circuit exercises jurisdiction over most of the cases that raise
substantive patent law issues while ensuring that the court does not
have jurisdiction over too many cases which do not present any
substantive patent law issues.
Permissive counterclaims that state a cause of action arising under
the patent laws should be permitted to confer Federal Circuit
jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Compulsory
counterclaims should provide a basis for Federal Circuit jurisdiction
only when the jurisdictional determination is federal versus federal,
but not in a state versus federal determination.
Bright-line jurisdictional rules should be drawn by the Federal
Circuit which provide that: (1) amended complaints always control
for jurisdictional purposes; (2) when cases are consolidated, the
Federal Circuit should have jurisdiction over the entire case if it
would have had jurisdiction over either case if the cases were not
consolidated; (3) when cases are severed, the Federal Circuit should
look only to the portion of the case on appeal to determine jurisdic-
tion; and (4) when cases are separated or counts are withdrawn or
dismissed, the Federal Circuit should look to the case actually filed to
determine if it has jurisdiction over the case. The sole exception to
this last rule, however, should provide that Federal Circuitjurisdiction
be denied when the complaint asserts manipulative or frivolous
allegations.
Finally, when the jurisdictional determination is federal versus
federal, the "arising under" jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit should
be interpreted broadly by applying Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust
Co. When a state versus federal dispute is at issue, however, tradition
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al "arising under" analysis should apply. Such analysis will ensure that
the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over more patent cases and
increase the predictability of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction.
